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CONSTITUTIONAL & PROPERTY LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE & NOTICE TO BE HEARD-IT FELT SO RIGHT BUT
WAS ALL SO WRONG: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULES
ARKANSAS'S TAX-FORECLOSURE NOTICE PROCEDURE FAILS TO SATISFY
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE WHEN CERTIFIED MAIL NOTICE RETURNS
"UNCLAIMED." Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years, governments across the world have used prop-
erty taxation as a source of revenue.' In ancient Egypt, ancient Greece, and
the Roman Empire, the government sold the right to collect taxes to private
individuals.2 This practice eventually continued through England and carried
over to the United States during the colonial period.3 Although contempo-
rary collection procedures have mostly abandoned third-party "tax farming,"
local governments in the United States still rely on real property taxation as
a dominant source of revenue.4 Rather than establish a clear, uniform model
of tax collection, the federal government allows each state to develop its
own form of governance, resulting in over 150 different tax collection sys-
tems within the United States.5
Unfortunately, not all property taxes are paid, and the county govern-
ment must seize the delinquent taxpayer's property in order to fulfill the
taxpayer's obligation.6 Because the state government terminates the delin-
quent taxpayer's constitutional right to property interest, the Constitution
requires the government to give the delinquent taxpayer notice of the pend-
ing action.7 Although recently it appears that the Supreme Court has been
increasing the due process requirements for notice before a tax foreclosure
1. Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 752
(2000).
2. Id. at 758.
3. Id. at 759.
4. Id. at 752.
5. Id. at 748. State tax laws are local rather than federal because the federal system
permits "experimentation among our various states in achieving the best forms of gover-
nance." Id.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-36-201 (2005), amended by Ark. Laws Act 706 (April 4,
2007); see infra Part II.B.
7. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.8, at 104 (3d ed. 1999). The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sale,8 the Court has never clearly stated a due process standard for what con-
stitutes constitutionally adequate notice.9
One of the Court's most recent attempts to provide guidelines for suffi-
cient notice before a tax foreclosure proceeding was Jones v. Flowers,'° in
which the Court sought to answer the question whether due process requires
a state to take additional reasonable steps to provide a property owner with
notice of a tax sale when a certified mailing notice of the sale is returned to
the state "unclaimed."" Although the Court determined that due process
required the state to take additional reasonable steps, 2 it failed to provide
lower courts with clear guidelines for sufficient additional steps. Instead of
providing instruction for local governments and lower courts, the Jones de-
cision threatens to unfairly burden state governments by creating additional
requirements that they cannot define, thereby increasing the responsibility of
the state.
First, this note explores the historical development of the due process
notice requirement for tax foreclosure procedures. 13 The first part of the
background section begins with the development of the notice requirement
in the United States Supreme Court, 4 and the second part focuses on Arkan-
sas's development of the notice requirement. 15 Next, this note discusses the
case itself, beginning with a brief overview of the facts involved in Jones,
16
and then addressing the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts's majority opi-
nion 7 as well as Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion." Finally, in the signi-
ficance section, the note discusses some of the problems with the Jones case
as well as some questions the Court leaves unanswered.' 9 After providing
some possible explanations for the deficiencies of the case, 20 the note out-
8. See Andrea Lee Negroni, In the Courts, 08-06 MTGE. COMPL. LETTER 1, 2006.
9. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 7, at 86 (Supp. 2007).
10. 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) ("Jones lX').
11. Id. at 1712.
12. See infra Part III.B.1.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part 1I.B.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.1.
18. See infra Part III.B.2.
19. See infra Part IV.A. The Court failed to provide a clear, workable standard of what
constitutes adequate notice and failed to answer what, if any, additional reasonable steps are
required when notice is returned marked something other than "unclaimed." The Court also
left unanswered what kind of burden the commissioner has in attempting to identify a proper-
ty owner's correct mailing address.
20. See infra Part IV.B. These include the malleable nature of the due process principles
on which the Court relies, as well as the Court's changing membership.
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lines some of the immediate effects the Court's decision has within the state
of Arkansas.2 '
II. BACKGROUND
This section first examines the United States Supreme Court decisions
considering the adequacy of notice before Jones v. Flowers,22 beginning
with early developments around the turn of the twentieth century23 and con-
tinuing with significant developments in Supreme Court case law from the
1950S24 through the beginning of the twenty-first century. 25 Second, this
section discusses Arkansas case law concerning the adequacy of notice be-
fore a tax foreclosure sale.26 Finally, this section details the statutory re-
quirements of the current tax foreclosure statute by explaining the process at
both county and state levels at all significant times during the foreclosure
procedure."
A. Supreme Court Decisions
This subsection begins by examining the early development of the no-
tice requirement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.28 United States Supreme Court decisions in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries exhibited two main characteristics in determining
the adequacy of notice under due process: (1) a reliance on the distinction
between in personam and in rem jurisdiction, 29 and (2) a general deference
for state court decisions through the recognition of state sovereignty."a
With the advent of automobiles and an increased number of people
crossing state lines, the traditional notions of in personam and in rem juris-
diction began to break down,3 paving the way for the Court's decision in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company,32 which marked a
turning point from the last half-century of Supreme Court cases and which
21. See infra Part IV.C. Immediate effects include increased litigation, an increased
burden on state governments, and adding an additional burden to the attempt to cure urban
blight.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part III.A.1.
24. See infra Part III.A.2.
25. See infra Part III.A.3-5.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part III.A. 1.
29. See infra Part III.A. l.a.
30. See infra Part III.A. 1 .b.
31. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977).
32. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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serves as one of the guideposts for due process considerations today.33 After
Mullane, the Court began to show less deference for state court decisions
and began to increase the amount of notice due process required.3 4 Although
Mullane did not answer the question of what notice is due to third-party
interests, the Court in later decisions attempted to provide an answer to this
issue.35 Following Justice Jackson's reasoning in Mullane, the Court also
began to develop a balancing test for determining the adequacy of notice,
but Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually rejected this test in Dusenbery v.
United States,36 four years before the Court considered Jones v. Flowers.37
1. Early Development of the Notice Requirement
a. The distinction between proceedings in personam and pro-
ceedings in rem
Early cases answering the question of what constituted sufficient notice
under the Due Process Clause focused or the distinction between two differ-
ent judicial jurisdiction avenues: (1) in personam jurisdiction, under which
an individual had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2)
in rem jurisdiction, under which the subject matter of the dispute38 was lo-
cated within the forum state.39 Proceedings in rem carried a less substantial
notice requirement than proceedings in personam.4° While in personam pro-
ceedings required the state physically to serve an individual within its bor-
ders, in rem proceedings required only service upon the thing itself and no-
tice by publication.4 Eventually, the Supreme Court held that service on the
land itself was not required, reasoning that "technical service" on the land
itself would be pointless and "add nothing to the procedure" when the owner
of the land was unknown.42
33. See infra Part III.A.2.
34. See infra Part III.A.3.
35. See infra Part III.A.4.
36. 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
37. See infra Part III.A.5.
38. The property was the subject matter of an in rem proceeding. Alexander, supra note
1, at 764.
39. See id. The Court's decision in Pennoyer v. Neff established the distinction between
in personam and in rem proceedings. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). An example
of an in personam proceeding is an action to recover on a debt owed, while examples of in
rem proceedings include actions to quiet title and foreclosure proceedings.
40. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 764.
41. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 91 (1904); see Alexander, supra note 1, at 764.
42. Leigh, 193 U.S. at 91 (noting that "publication of notice which described the land is
certainly the equal in publicity of any seizure which can be made of it"). Id. at 91-92.
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Court decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were generally very deferent to state requirements of notice by publication
for in rem proceedings.43 In one of the earliest cases to consider the adequa-
cy of a state notice procedure under the Due Process Clause," the Court held
"a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden ... cannot be said to deprive
the owner of his property without due process of law" as long as the state
provides notice to the property owner.45 Accordingly, a state statute that
provided notice by publication to unknown owners of property was suffi-
cient.46
In considering the notice required to enforce the payment of property
taxes, the Court in Winona & St. Peter Land Company v. Minnesota47 held
that notice by publication to all interested parties was "suitable" and "suffi-
ciently answer[ed] the demand of due process of law."4 8 Similarly, in Leigh
v. Green,4 9 the Court held that proceedings to enforce the payment of taxes
through a tax sale required only notice permitting all interested parties "to
ascertain" that the property was for sale and allowing those parties to be
heard, whether residents or non-residents of the state.5" Proceedings in rem
did not require actual or personal service, and if the state actually provided
personal service to property owners, it was not out of necessity, but out of
"tenderness to [the property holder's] interests."'" Following both Winona
and Leigh, the Court in Longyear v. Toolan52 found that notice by publica-
tion to a resident property owner was sufficient because the property owner
who failed to pay taxes for a year was presumed to know that tax sale pro-
ceedings were imminent.53
Even when an owner of property failed to receive notice because his
name was misspelled on both mailed and published notices, the Court in
Grannis v. Ordean54 affirmed the Minnesota supreme court's holding of
43. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928) (noting a "general trend of authority
toward sustaining the validity of service of process, if the statutory provisions in themselves
indicate that there is reasonable probability that if the statutes are complied with, the defen-
dant will receive actual notice"); see also Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 257 (1907) (stat-
ing the general principle that "[i]t is not the province of [the] court to interfere with the policy
of the revenue laws of the state, nor with the interpretation given to them by their courts")
(quoting Witherspoon v. Duncan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 210 (1866)).
44. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
45. Id. at 104-05.
46. Id. at 105-06.
47. 159 U.S. 526 (1895).
48. Id. at 538.
49. 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
50. Id. at 92-93.
51. Id. at 90 (quoting Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed. 527).
52. 209 U.S. 414 (1908).
53. Id. at 418. Justice Moody stated that the case was indistinguishable from Winona. Id.
54. 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
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sufficient due process.55 The Court focused on the distinction between in
personam and in rem proceedings to conclude that the state must give con-
structive notice to the property owner through publication or mailing, and
the notice must substantially comply with the statutory prescriptions.56 Jus-
tice Pitney noted that substantial compliance with due process did not "im-
pose an unattainable standard of accuracy," nor did it require "ideal accura-
cy" in affirming the state court's holding.57
b. State sovereignty
Just as the Supreme Court was deferent to the state's established notice
system, it was also unsympathetic to non-resident property owners alleging
that the state's notice system was insufficient under the requirements of due
process. Implicit in these decisions, as well as the ones discussed above, was
the notion of state sovereignty: a state must have power to control the prop-
erty within its limits, and therefore it must be able to bring a non-resident
into its courts. 58 In Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway & Improvement Compa-
ny,59 Justice Miller held that non-resident property owners retained duties
and obligations to the forum state and could not exempt their property from
state-imposed obligations.6" According to Justice Miller, substituted service
like notice of publication "ha[d] always been held to be a sufficient warn-
ing," and if the non-resident property owner failed to protect himself so as to
receive notice by publication, then it was the non-resident's own fault for
doing so.6 Fifteen years after Huling, the Court in Leigh v. Green explicitly
recognized the sovereign right of a state to collect taxes according to its own
terms, therefore the federal government could interfere with the state's right
55. Id. at 398. The property owner's correct name was Albert B. Geilfuss, but the per-
sonal summons contained the names "Albert Guilfuss" and "Albert B. Guilfuss." Id. at 387-
88. The sheriff returned the summons, which were then mailed to Albert Guilfuss and Albert
B. Guilfuss. Id. at 388. Additional service by publication contained the names "Albert Guil-
fuss" and "Albert B. Guilfuss." Id. Except for the misnomer, the state complied with the
statutory requirements of notice. Id. at 388-89.
56. Id. at 393.
57. Grannis, 234 U.S. at 395. In this case, the Court asked whether a letter addressed to
"Albert Guilfuss" or "Albert B. Guilfuss" would be delivered to Albert B. Geilfuss with
reasonable probability, and whether the published notices with the misspellings would come
to the attention of Albert B. Geilfus or anyone who knew him. Id. at 397.
58. See Roller v. Holley, 176 U.S. 398, 404 (1900).
59. 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
60. Id. at 563-64.
61. Id.
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only when necessary to protect the rights guaranteed under the Constitu-
62tion.
In Ballard v. Hunter,63 non-resident property owners of Arkansas land
contended that the state tax-sale statute discriminated against them by creat-
ing different notice requirements for resident and non-resident property
owners in the event of a tax sale. 4 Although the statute required personal
service for resident property owners, it allowed for notice by publication for
non-resident property owners.65 The Court recognized that the state could
not give personal notice to every interested party and that indirect notice
was usually sufficient in in rem proceedings.66 Quoting Huling, Justice
McKenna held that non-resident property owners had a duty to keep in-
formed about their property interests in another state.67 Because the state
could assume that the property was cared for, indirect notice to non-resident
property owners was sufficient.68
The Court continued to recognize the power and the right of the states
to exercise "reasonable methods" of notice in American Land Company v.
Zeiss, 69 noting that due process only restrains the states from acting so arbi-
trarily and unreasonably "as to impair or destroy fundamental rights."7
Where a statute provided for the safeguard and protection of the rights of
unknown claimants and gave notice that "would be reasonably likely" to
provide notice to the interested parties, then notice was sufficient.7 ' An im-
agined situation in which a property owner was "adversely affected" without
receiving actual notice was not a sufficient objection to the adequacy of
notice, but instead "denied the power of the state to deal with the subject.
7 2
Recognizing the duty of the non-resident to his property as established in
62. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, at 89. The Court also held that a state's tax foreclosure
notice was not required to meet the same standards as notice in "a suit at law." Id. (quoting
Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890)).
63. 204 U.S. 241 (1907).
64. Id. at 254.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 262.
67. Id. Justice McKenna also stated that property owners usually do keep themselves
informed about their property interests in foreign states. Id.
68. Id. ("Of what concerns or may concern their real estate men usually keep informed,
and on that probability the law may frame its proceedings: indeed, must frame them, and
assume the care of property to be universal, if it would give efficiency to many of its exercis-
es.").
69. 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
70. Id. at 66.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 66-67.
2007]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Huling,73 the Court held that actual notice is not required in all cases, only
that notice must be just and reasonable under the circumstances.74
Despite the Court's strong deference to state notice policies, the states
did not have absolute power in determining what notice was sufficient for
non-resident property owners. Roller v. Holly75 made it clear that notice
must be reasonable for its purpose, refusing to uphold a notice statute that
required a non-resident to be subject to a hearing within five days of ser-
vice. 76 Furthermore, in McDonald v. Mabee77 the Court held that notice by
publication in a local newspaper was not sufficient "to bind a person" who
had permanently left the state. 78 According to McDonald, the least amount
of notice required under "substantial justice" was the notice most likely to
reach the interested party.79
2. The Mullane Decision
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company8" marked a signif-
icant departure from the case law developed almost a century before its de-
cision because it proved many assumptions about notice and due process to
be erroneous." First, the Supreme Court refused to consider the distinction
between in rem and in personam actions in determining the requirements of
due process.12 Second, while declining to establish a set of notice specifica-
tions to apply in every case, the Court established a reasonableness test
based on the "particularities and practicalities" of an individual case.
83
Third, the Court refused to defer to the state court's decision of what consti-
tuted sufficient notice.84 Scholars recognize the Mullane opinion, considered
the seminal due process and notice case," as "the keystone of the modem
73. Id. at 69. The Court also quoted extensively from Ballard.
74. Id. at 67.
75. 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
76. Id. at 409-10. The property in this case was located in Texas and the non-resident
property owner lived in Virginia. Id. at 401-02. After looking at the time for appearance
provisions in notice statutes from other states, the Court decided that the Texas statute's time
period of five days was not reasonable. Id. at 411, 413.
77. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
78. Id. at 92.
79. Id.
80. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
81. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1074, at 365 (3d ed. 2002).
82. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312.
83. Id. at 314.
84. Id. at 315.
85. Erwin Chemerinsky, Upholding Due Process, 42-JUL Trial 84, 84 (2006); Patrick J.
Borchers, Jones v. Flowers: An Essay on a Unified Theory of Procedural Due Process, 40
CREIGHTON L. REv. 343, 344 (2007).
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philosophy regarding the due process aspects of a notice requirement, '86 and
Mullane serves as the modem standard for testing the constitutionality of
notice and service of process.8 7
The cause of action in Mullane arose after the Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Company in New York ("the Bank") established a common trust
fund under the laws of that state.88 After petitioning the Surrogate's Court
for settlement of the first common trust account, the Bank strictly complied
with the state statute's 9 minimum notice requirements by publishing notice
in a local paper.9 The published notice included "the name and address of
the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the common
trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts, or funds."'" Although
the Bank was located in New York, not all of the beneficiaries in the com-
mon trust fund were residents of New York, and Kenneth Mullane, ap-
pointed as "special guardian and attorney for all persons known or un-
known," contended that the notice to the beneficiaries was inadequate under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
Justice Jackson began the majority opinion by considering the power of
the state to hear the claim of nonresidents who received no personal ser-
vice. 93 While the distinction between in rem and in personam actions may
have served the legal system in the past,9' the recognition of intangible
forms of property as well as new forms of proceedings had eroded this "old
procedural classification." 95 Accordingly, Justice Jackson held that the due
86. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 81, at 368.
87. See Jeremy A. Colby, You've Got Mail: The Modem Trend Towards Universal
Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 337 (2003).
88. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309.
89. The New York statute read:
After filing such petition (for judicial settlement of its account) the petitioner shall cause to
be issued by the court in which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in
each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the court a notice or
citation addressed generally without naming them to all parties interest in such common trust
fund and in such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of which may be de-
scribed in the notice or citation only in the manner set forth in said petition and without set-
ting forth the residence of any decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or fund.
N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(12), quoted in Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309-10.
90. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309-10.
91. Id.at310.
92. Id. at 309-11.
93. Id. at 311.
94. Justice Jackson described the legal system under which this distinction operated as




process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment did not depend on the in
rem or in personam classification.96
Next, the Court turned to the requirements under the Due Process
Clause, holding that, at a minimum, an individual must receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the state can deprive him of life, liberty, or
property.97 Although personal service was always adequate, it was not al-
ways necessary, especially for nonresidents.9" The type of notice required in
a specific case did not depend on any set formula, but the notice used must
comply with certain general principles of reasonableness. 99 Primarily, notice
must be reasonably calculated to "apprise the interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action," based on the "practicalities and peculiarities" of the
case.'00 Furthermore, the means utilized to give notice must be more than a
"mere gesture," but must be such "as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish [notice]."''
After considering these general notice principles, Justice Jackson held
that notice by publication alone was not a reliable means of notice.'0 2 Al-
though publication may be acceptable as a supplemental notice °3 or in cases
in which there is no other possible or practical way to give more adequate
notice, Justice Jackson reasoned that it was not sufficient in the case at hand
where the beneficiaries' names and addresses were known. '4 Although re-
cognizing that due process did not require "impracticable and extended
searches" for unascertainable beneficiaries or beneficiaries with conjectural
or future interests, according to Justice Jackson the trustee at least had the
duty to send notice by mail to those beneficiaries whose names and ad-
96. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312. According to Justice Jackson, this classification was elu-
sive, confused, and varied from state to state. Id.
97. Id. at 313. The Court recognized possible deprivation of property in two ways: (1)
by cutting off the beneficiaries' "rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests," and (2) subjecting the beneficiaries' interest to diminution
through fees and expenses of the proceeding. Id.
98. Id. at 313-14.
99. Id. at 314.
100. Id. Other reasonableness requirements include reasonably conveying the required
information and "afford[ing] a reasonable time for those interested to make their appear-
ance." Id.
101. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
102. Id. at 315. Justice Jackson reasoned, in another often-quoted passage from this case,
that "[c]hance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper." Id. This chance is reduced if the resident
lives outside the paper's circulation or if the notice does not name the interested parties, as
was the case here. Id.
103. For instance, when a state seizes property within its own borders, notice by publica-
tion acts as an additional method of notice. The entry upon the real estate in the first place
serves as notice to the property owner, who will assumedly guard his own property interest or
place it in the hands of a caretaker. Id. at 316.
104. Id. at 319.
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dresses it had at hand. 0 5 Justice Jackson stopped short of requiring personal
service for every individual beneficiary, holding that notice reasonably cer-
tain to reach most of the interested parties would likely protect the interest
of all beneficiaries.
0 6
Although the Mullane decision made it clear that notice by publication
alone would not be sufficient if the name and address of the interested party
are known or easily ascertainable, 10 7 the case did not establish clear require-
ments for sufficient notice under the Due Process Clause." 8 What consti-
tuted sufficient notice under the Mullane reasonableness test depended on a
variety of factors,0 9 and it was unclear what steps the tax authorities had to
take in order to identify interested parties to a suit.10
3. Stepping Up the Requirements After Mullane
After Mullane, state tax authorities could no longer rely on notice by
publication alone, and the cases following Mullane upheld this rule."' In
City of New York v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Compa-
ny," 2 the Supreme Court held that notice by publication of a creditor bar
order was not sufficient notice to the city of New York, where the city had
imposed liens on the debtor railroad's property and the city never received a
copy of the bar order. 1 3 The Bankruptcy Act required mailing copies of a
bar order to creditors who had already appeared in court, while all other
creditors were given "constructive notice" through publication.' The Court
105. Id. 317-18. Justice Jackson recognized ordinary mail as "an efficient and inexpen-
sive means of communication." Id. at 319.
106. Id. at 319.
107. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
108. Alexander, supra note 1, at 767.
109. Id. These factors included "the nature of the legal proceedings, the due diligence
necessary to identify the interested parties and their addresses, the costs associated with such
identification, and whether the notice is likely to reach and inform the interested parties of the
proceeding." Id.
110. Id.
111. Marvin N. Bagwell, Supreme Court Raises Bar for Due Process, 185 N.J. L.J. 288
(2006); see Borchers, supra note 85, at 346 ("The consequence of Mullane [sic] and its pro-
gency was to strike down statute that relied entirely on notification methods such as newspa-
per publication, courthouse postings, postings on real estate[,] and the like.").
112. 344U.S. 293 (1953).
113. Id. at 294, 296. The Court debated whether the city of New York was actually a
creditor under the Bankruptcy Act. The majority, led by Justice Black, held that New York
was a creditor of the railroad, while Justice Frankfirter, in a separate opinion joined by Jus-
tice Jackson, argued that New York was not a creditor because its claim was in rem. Id. at
296-97.
114. Id. at 294.
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held that the city did not receive reasonable notice under the Mullane stan-
dard."5
The Court also began to overturn more state court findings of sufficient
notice following Mullane. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson,' 6 the Court
overturned the Kansas Supreme Court, which had held that notice by publi-
cation as provided by the statute was sufficient under the Due Process
Clause." 7 Noting that in many cases "notice by publication is no notice at
all," the majority in Walker held that notice by publication did not meet the
requirements of due process because the city knew the party's name."1 8
As a result of the Mullane holding, tax authorities actually began to
mail notice to the interested party,"9 but these attempted methods of notice
were not always sufficient. Where the state knew prior to sending the notice
that the mailing of notice would be ineffective, the Court deemed the notice
insufficient.1 20 In Covey v. Town of Somers, the local government sought to
foreclose against various delinquent properties, one of which Nora Brainard
owned. 12' Although town officials knew Brainard was incompetent "to han-
dle her affairs or to understand the meaning of any notice served upon her"
and that she had no appointed guardian, the town followed the statutory no-
tice requirements by sending her notice by mail, posting notice at the post
office, and publishing notice in two local papers. 22 The Court held that be-
cause the town officials knew that Brainard was incompetent and without
the protection of a guardian, compliance with the notice statute did not meet
the Mullane reasonableness requirement. 23 Similarly, in Robinson v. Ha-
nrahan, the Court held that Illinois did not provide notice "reasonably calcu-
lated" to apprise the prisoner of the proceedings when the state sent notice to
the prisoner's house, even though the local government knew the individual
was in prison.'24
115. Id. at 294, 296.
116. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
117. Id. at 114-15.
118. Id. at 116-17. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter claimed that the lan-
downer's assertion of monetary loss of his property due to the state's exercise of eminent
domain was baseless. Id. at 120 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
119. Bagwell, supra note 111, at 288.
120. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409
U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam).
121. Covey, 351 U.S. at 144.
122. Id. at 144, 146.
123. Id. at 146. In a separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter questioned the rulings of the
New York state courts and why they would "sanction such a denial of due process." Id. at
147 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
124. Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40 (per curiam).
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Notice by posting also came under attack in the case of Greene v. Lind-
sey, 12 in which members of the sheriffs department posted notice of forci-
ble entry and detainer on the doors of a tenant's apartment. 126 The Court
noted that notice by posting generally provides a "constitutionally accepta-
ble means of service," and is sometimes the only effective way of providing
service short of personal service, because a property owner is presumed to
"maintain watch over his property."'127 In most situations, therefore, the state
may assume that notice by posting will provide sufficient warning to the
interested party. 2 8 In the instance case, however, testimony suggested that
the posted notices were "not infrequently" removed before coming to the
attention of the intended recipient.'29 Because notice by mail was "efficient
and inexpensive"'3 ° and could be addressed to the same location as the prop-
erty in question, the state's reliance on ineffective notice by posting failed to
pass the Mullane reasonableness test. 13' Although the Court struck down
posted notice based on the facts in Greene, "it explicitly endorsed the use of
posting in other circumstances," thereby leaving unanswered the question of
"what circumstances differentiate permissible from impermissible post-
ing."
132
4. Notifying Third Parties: Mennonite and Tulsa Professional Col-
lection Services
Although most courts in the country following Mullane held that notice
by publication alone was inadequate when notice by mail was readily avail-
able, they were unable to establish a consensus on the state's duty, if any, to
locate and notify third parties with an interest in the property.' The Su-
preme Court in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams 134 attempted to an-
swer that question by holding that the state was required to provide a mort-
gagee of the property with actual notice of the tax sale, rather than relying
125. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
126. Id. at 446.
127. Id. at 451-52.
128. Id. at 452.
129. Id. at 453.
130. In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the majority "reach[ed] this
conclusion despite the total absence of any evidence in the record regarding the speed and
reliability of the mails." Id. at 456 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455-56 (1982) (quoting Mullane v. Central Ha-
nover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)). The Court declined to follow the McDo-
nald test, which states that service "that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that
ought to be required." Id. at 455 (quoting McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917)).
132. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice: The Constitutionality of
Service of Process by Posting After Greene v. Lindsey, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 601, 603 (1984).
133. Alexander, supra note 1, at 767-68.
134. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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on notice by publication and posting or mailed notice to the property own-
er.
135
In Mennonite, the local county government initiated tax sale proceed-
ings and provided notice as required under the Indiana statute by posting
and publishing notice of the tax sale and mailing notice via certified mail to
the owner of the property.'36 The mortgagee on record at the county record-
er's office, however, never received notice of the sale and did not learn that
the property had been sold until after the redemption period had passed.
137
After stating that the Mullane reasonableness test controlled the analysis of
the present case, Justice Marshall noted that the mortgagee had a "substan-
tial property interest ... significantly affected by a tax sale," and therefore
was entitled to reasonable notice. 38 Because the mortgage was recorded and
the mortgagee was reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone was not
sufficient and should have been supplemented by mailing notice to the
mortgagee or by personal service.'39 After evaluating the effectiveness of
notice by mail, Justice Marshall concluded that notice "certain to ensure
actual notice" is the minimal requirement for a proceeding adversely affect-
ing "the liberty or property interests of any party.'
140
Although Mennonite may have resolved some lingering issues intro-
duced by the Mullane decision,14' the Court's heightened standards of due
process only created new problems. 42 For instance, it was unclear what kind
135. Id. at 799-800. In her dissenting opinion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor found the majority's decision "unwarranted" because it "depart[ed] signifi-
cantly from [the Court's] prior decisions" and applied a "novel and unjustified principle." Id.
at 800-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 794 (majority opinion).
137. Id. The mortgagee did not even know that the property owner had failed to pay the
taxes on the property as agreed to under the terms of the mortgage. Id. at 792.
138. Id. at 798.
139. Id. According to Justice Marshall, the state's attempted notices by publication, post-
ing, and mailing to the property owner were not sufficient because they were not methods
"such as one desirous of actually informing the [mortgagee] might reasonably adopt to ac-
complish it." Id. at 799 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 315 (1950)). Justice Marshall also held that these methods of constructive notice failed
in regards to the mortgagee because it would be unlikely for the property owner "who is not
in privity with his creditor and who has failed to take steps necessary to preserve his own
property interest" to give actual notice to the mortgagee. Id.
140. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799-800 (emphasis in original). Justice O'Connor called this
a "novel and unjustified principle." Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. According to Frank Alexander, Mennonite resolved three issues:
First, the standards of notice applicable to in personam jurisdiction are equally appropriate in
in rem jurisdiction. Second, mortgagees, as holders of legally protected property interests, are
entitled to the protections of due process just as much as owners. Third, names and addresses
available from the deed records must be used to provide notice to interested parties.
Alexander, supra note 1, at 768.
142. Id. at 768.
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of notice the state was obligated to give other potentially interested parties
43
and what kind of efforts constituted reasonable diligence in locating these
parties.' 44 Furthermore, after Mennonite some lower courts began to favor
the governmental interest of efficiency in the collection of taxes over other
interests, while other lower courts held efficiency subordinate to the re-
quirements of due process.
45
The Court addressed some of these issues in Tulsa Professional Collec-
tion Services, Inc. v. Pope,'46 which considered the amount of notice due to a
creditor in the context of probate proceedings. 147 Building on the decision in
Mennonite, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that the credi-
tor's claim constituted a protected property interest deserving protection
from "deprivation by state action."' 148 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor held
that known or reasonably ascertainable creditors must receive actual no-
tice.' 49 The state need not go so far as to locate every individual "who may
conceivably have a claim," and the state may forgo actual notice for indi-
viduals with only "conjectural" claims. 5° The Court also rejected the claim
that the need for efficiency "justifies less than actual notice," noting that it
had rejected this argument in other contexts, such as in the administration of
claims and in bankruptcy and trust proceedings. 5' The Court stopped short,
however, of defining what constitutes "reasonably diligent efforts" in locat-
ing "reasonably ascertainable" third parties, instead remanding the case for
the lower court to determine whether the present creditor would have been
identified using such methods. 5 '
143. Other interested parties could include "concurrent owners, holders of subordinate
judgment liens, occupants of the property, [and] holders of easements and covenants." Id.
Some lower courts have held that contract vendees and judgment creditors must receive no-
tice by mail. Bagwell, supra note 111, at 288. Furthermore, many state statutes require that
the occupants of property receive notice "as a matter of course." Baxter Dunaway, Other
Bars to Foreclosure-Requirement for Notice of Foreclosure, 2 L. Distressed Real Est. §
15:27 (2006).
144. Alexander, supra note 1, at 768-69.
145. Id. at 769.
146. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
147. Id. at 479.
148. Id. at 485.
149. Id. at 490. Notice by publication is sufficient only for creditors who are not "reason-
ably ascertainable" through "reasonably diligent efforts." Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 490-91. Justice O'Connor cited Mullane as the authority on the rejection of the
efficiency argument in trust claims. Id. at 491.
152. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at491.
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5. Balancing Interests: Use and Discontinuance
For a half century after the decision in Mullane, the Supreme Court's
opinions indicated that judges were required to use both a reasonableness
test and a balancing test in determining the adequacy of notice. 15 3 In Mul-
lane, Justice Jackson balanced the interests of the state against the interests
of the individual in establishing the reasonableness test, but he did not expli-
citly develop any kind of balancing test, 154 and at least one author has cited
the failure of the Mullane standard to incorporate the balancing of govern-
ment and individual interests as a shortcoming of the Court's decision.155
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 5 6 the Court introduced a three-part balancing
test in order to determine the adequacy of notice before a termination of
Social Security benefits:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 1
57
Two years after the Mathews decision, the Court in Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division v. Craft'58 used the three-part balancing test to deter-
mine the "specific dictates of due process" in the case of a utility company
terminating a customer's electric, gas, and water services. 5 9 The Court also
used the Mullane reasonableness test to determine that notice was not suffi-
cient when the utility company failed to give a customer information "on the
availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed termination of utility
services as unjustified."'
' 60
In her dissenting opinion for Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
6'
Justice O'Connor stated that, according to Mullane, the reasonableness of
notice depended on a balancing between the state and the individual inter-
153. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 7, at 26 (Supp. 2007).
154. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("[a]gainst
this interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."). See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 7.
155. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading Cases, 120 HARv. L. REv. 233, 238
(2006) [hereinafter "Tax Sales"].
156. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
157. Id. at 335.
158. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
159. Id. at 17.
160. Id. at 15.
161. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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ests. 62 The state's interests included the collection of tax revenues "in what-
ever reasonable manner that it [chose]" and avoiding the burden of identify-
ing and locating parties with legally protected property interests, while the
individual's interests included protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
and protecting one's own property.'63 Justice O'Connor concluded that due
process did not require the state to "save the [individual] from its own lack
of care. , ,16
Justice O'Connor got the chance to use her version of the balancing test
by writing for the majority in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.
Pope.165 In determining whether actual notice was justified, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court should consider "the practicalities of the
situation" and the effect of actual notice on "important state interests."'
16
Although the State had an interest in resolving probate proceedings expedi-
tiously and without undue cost, Justice O'Connor noted that actual notice is
not necessarily "inefficient or burdensome," especially service by mail. 1
67
Justice O'Connor concluded that "on balance," the requirement that the state
send actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors was not
"so cumbersome" as to hinder the efficiency of probate proceedings.168
Although the Court in Mullane and Mennonite failed to offer explicit
standards for determining adequate notice under due process, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Tulsa seemed to establish the balancing test
as a clear requirement for determining required notice. 169 In one of the last
cases concerning the adequacy of notice before Jones v. Flowers, however,
the Court explicitly denied application of the Mathews balancing test as de-
scribed by Justice O'Connor. 7 °
In Dusenbery v. United States, the Court examined the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's (FBI) method for providing notice to a federal prisoner.'7 '
Although recognizing that the Court utilized the Mathews balancing test in
other contexts, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court never consi-
162. Id. at 806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, the majority
created a rigid general principle to be applied in every case, a practice the Court expressly
rejected in Walker v. City of Hutchinson. Id. at 802.
163. Id. at 806-07.
164. Id. at 809.
165. 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988) (noting that since the Mullane decision "the Court has
adhered to [the] principles . . . [of] balancing the 'interest of the State' and 'the individual
interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"' (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))).
166. Id. at489.
167. Id. at489-90.
168. Id. at 490.
169. Alexander, supra note 1, at 778.
170. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002).
171. Id. at 163.
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dered Mathews as prescribing "an all-embracing test" for due process
claims.12 Instead, the Court returned to the "more straightforward" reasona-
bleness test of Mullane.173 After examining the prisoner's arguments, Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that the Due Process Clause did not require "heroic
efforts" on the part of the government (like exerting special effort to provide
actual receipt of notice to an interested party), only "reasonably calculated"
efforts to reach the interested party.'74
Chief Justice Rehnquist also discussed Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion, particularly her argument that notice in the present case was insuf-
ficient because it was "substantially less likely to bring home notice" than a
reasonable alternative.'75 Because the Bureau of Prisons had upgraded its
delivery methods since the filing of this case, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
the government could have "tried harder" to give better notice through a
feasible and more reliable alternative.'76 Chief Justice Rehnquist held, how-
ever, that the government should not be "penalized" because the Bureau of
Prisons had upgraded its policies after the fact, pointing out that the Court
had never found that "improvements in the reliability of new procedures"
demonstrated inadequacies in the replaced methods. 77 Accordingly, the




The tax foreclosure procedure in Arkansas begins at the county level
after the property owner fails to pay taxes on the property and the property
172. Id. at 167-68.
173. Id. The Court cited numerous cases that used Mullane when considering the adequa-
cy of notice, all of which have been discussed above. See Tulsa Prof l, 485 U.S. 478 (1988);
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U.S. 444 (1982); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); Schroeder v. City
of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); New
York City v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
174. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170.
175. Id. at 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15). While
all four dissenting Justices agreed that the Mullane reasonableness test was the correct test
use in determining the adequacy of notice, they argued that the procedures utilized in this
case were not reasonably reliable. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 7, at 28 n.33.70 (Supp.
2007). All of the dissenters in Dusenbery joined Chief Justice Roberts in Jones. Linda
Greenhouse, Court Puts Teeth in 'Notice' Needed to Seize Property, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2006, at A18.
176. Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 172.
178. Id. at 172-73.
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becomes delinquent. 7 9 After verifying the delinquent property and allowing
the property owner to pay the delinquent taxes on the property, the county
certifies the delinquent property to the Commissioner of State Lands (the
"Commissioner") and thereby forfeits the property to the state. 8 ' At this
point, the county's duties to the property end and the Commissioner com-
pletes the process of the tax foreclosure sale.' 8 ' The Commissioner sends
notice of sale by certified mail to all owners of the property one year before
the sale date'82 and again sends notice to all interested parties six months
before the sale.'83 At least thirty days before the date of the sale, the com-
missioner publishes notice of the sale of the property in the newspaper. 184
Although Arkansas's statute provides a set procedure for tax foreclo-
sure sales, the nature of the sale lends itself to litigation based on due
process grounds, especially claims for lack of notice. First, this subsection
discusses some of the general principles developed in Arkansas courts con-
cerning the adequacy of notice. 185 The first general principle considered is
the extent of due process required before the state may deprive an individual
of his or her property.'86 The second general principle is strict compliance to
statutory requirements and its effect on tax foreclosure sales.' 87 Second, this
subsection discusses a case with facts substantially similar to those in Jones
v. Flowers.'88
179. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-36-201 (2005), amended by Ark. Laws Act 706 (April 4,
2007). When the property becomes delinquent, the county collector publishes a list of delin-
quent properties, by name, in the newspaper for two consecutive weeks. Id. § 26-37-107
(Repl. 1997).
180. Id. § 26-37-101 (Repl. 1997). At this point, title to the property passes to the state.
Id. This procedure makes Arkansas a "title theory" state rather than a "lien theory" state with
respect to tax foreclosures. Interview with Carol Lincoln, Staff Attorney, Ark. Comm'r of
State Lands, in Little Rock, Ark. (Feb. 8, 2007).
181. Id.§25-37-101.
182. Id. § 26-37-301(a)-(b) (Repl. 1997). The commissioner is not required to give notice
to an individual acquiring an interest in the property after the property is certified by the
county to the Commissioner. Id. § 26-37-301(d).
183. Id. § 26-37-301.
184. Id. § 26-37-201(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). The notice must contain the assessed value of the
land, the amount of taxes, interest, penalties and other costs due on the land, the name of the
owner, the legal description and parcel number of the property, a list of recorded liens against
the property known to the commissioner, and must indicate that the property will be sold to
the highest bidder as long as the bid meets certain minimum requirements. Id. § 26-37-
201(b), amended by 2007 Ark. Laws Act 706 (April 4,2007).
185. See infra Part II.B. I.
186. See infra Part II.B.l.a.
187. See infra Part II.B.l.b.





State of Washington v. Thompson"s' sets out Arkansas's due process
requirements.' At a minimum, an individual must receive notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity for a hearing before the state deprives the individual of
his or her property.' Rather than requiring a "universally applicable" and
inflexible procedure, due process depends on the circumstances and interests
involved in the case. " Citing Mathews, the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Thompson stated that the "fundamental requirement of due process [was] the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,"
and that determining what notice is due depends on weighing the three Ma-
thews factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of "an erroneous
deprivation" of the private interest in the property through the state's actions
and the probative value of procedural safeguards; and (3) the state's interest
in efficient administration of governmental affairs without undue procedural
burdens.9 3 The extent of due process afforded an individual depends on
whether the private interest of avoiding the loss outweighs the state's inter-
ests. 194
b. Strict compliance
In cases involving tax sales of delinquent property, Arkansas courts
have consistently held that the state must strictly comply with the notice
statute before depriving a property owner of his property.' 95 Because of the
189. 339 Ark. 417,6 S.W.3d 82 (1999).
190. Id. at 425-26, 6 S.W.3d at 87. Although Thompson involves the enforcement of
child support payments, a later Arkansas case concerning the adequacy of notice before the
sale of delinquent property cites Thompson as authority on the state's due process require-
ments. See infra Part II.B.2.
191. Thompson, 339 Ark. at 425, 6 S.W.3d at 87 (citing Owings v. Econ. & Med. Servs.,
302 Ark. 475, 790 S.W.2d 438 (1990)).
192. Thompson, 339 Ark. at 425-26, 6 S.W.3d at 87 (citing South Cent. Dist., Pentecostal
Church of God of America, Inc. v. Bruce-Rogers, 269 Ark. 130, 599 S.W.2d 702 (1980),
abrogated by Leonards v. E.A. Martin Machinery Co., 321 Ark. 239, 900 S.W.2d 546
(1995)).
193. Thompson, 339 Ark. at 426, 6 S.W.3d at 87 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334-35 (1976)); see McCrory v. Johnson, 296 Ark. 231, 238-39, 755 S.W.2d 566, 569
(1988).
194. Thompson, 339 Ark. at 426, 6 S.W.3d at 87.
195. Tsann Kuen Enter. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 117, 129 S.W.3d 822, 826
(2003); Jones v. Double "D" Props., Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 44, 98 S.W.3d 405, 407 (2003); Sand-
ers v. Ryles, 318 Ark. 418, 423, 885 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1994); Pyle v. Robertson, 313 Ark.
692, 694, 858 S.W.2d 662, 663 (1993); Trs. of First Baptist Church v. Ward, 286 Ark. 238,
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strict compliance standard, Arkansas courts have been unwilling to look
outside the statute in an attempt to imply legislative intent. Instead, Arkan-
sas courts will construe a statute "just as it reads" if the language of the sta-
tute is clear and unambiguous.'96 For instance, the court in Wilson v. Da-
niels197 was concerned that the statute in that case did not provide a time
period under which the commissioner must give notice of a tax sale, and the
Arkansas Court of Appeals concluded that it could not require more than
what was provided in the statute.
198
As a result of this unwillingness to look outside the specific require-
ments of a statute, Arkansas courts have repeatedly held that the state is not
required to take additional procedures after attempted notice by certified
mail returns unclaimed.' 99 In Wilson, the commissioner first sent notice of
tax delinquency to a wrong address, which was returned "attempted not
known," and then sent a second notice to the property owner's correct ad-
dress, which was also returned "unclaimed or refused."2 ° Although the
property owner never received the notice of her tax delinquency, the trial
court ruled that the commissioner had fully complied with the statute requir-
ing the commissioner to notify the owner at the owner's last known mailing
address, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed.2"'
Similarly, in Jones v. Double "D" Properties202 the commissioner sent
notice via certified mail to the property owner's last known mailing address,
which was returned "unclaimed.""2 3 Citing Wilson, the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the commissioner strictly complied with the statute by "noti-
fy[ing] the owner, at the owner's last known address, by certified mail, of
the owner's right to redeem."20 4 The court noted that the commissioner must
not "take every step possible to see that the letter arrives in the property
owner's hand," only that the commissioner strictly comply with the statute's
requirements.0 5
241, 691 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1985) (holding notice to be void because it was not given during
the statutorily defined time period); Wilson v. Daniels, 64 Ark. App. 181, 183, 980 S.W.2d
274, 275 (1998).
196. Double "D" Props., 352 Ark. at 46, 98 S.W.3d at 408.
197. 64 Ark. App. 181, 980 S.W.2d 274 (1998).
198. Wilson, 64 Ark. App. at 184, 980 S.W.2d at 276.
199. See Tsann Kuen Enter. Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003);
Jones v. Double "D" Props., Inc., 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 (2003); Wilson, 64 Ark. App.
181, 980 S.W.2d 274.
200. Wilson, 64 Ark. App. at 182-83, 980 S.W.2d at 275.
201. Id. at 184, 980 S.W.2d at 276.
202. 352 Ark. 39, 98 S.W.3d 405 (2008).
203. Double "D" Props., 352 Ark. at 45, 98 S.W.3d at 408.
204. Id. at 45-46, 98 S.W.3d at 408-09.




In Tsann Kuen Enterprises Company v. Campbell,°6 before failing to
pay its property taxes, the corporation property owner Tsann Kuen moved
its corporate office without providing the new mailing address to the county
tax collector.207 After the county tax collector certified the property as delin-
quent, the commissioner sent notice of delinquency to Tsann Kuen's last
known mailing address, which was returned marked "unclaimed" and "for-
warding order expired., 20 8 Before selling the property, the commissioner
performed a title search on the delinquent property, and the only address
listed for Tsann Kuen was its old mailing address. 20 9 The commissioner sent
notice by certified mail to the address generated by the title search, which
was also returned marked "forwarding order expired., 2'0 After the sale, the
purchasers of the property posted a "Notice of Unlawful Detainer" on the
property and asked the trial court to remove Tsann Kuen from the proper-
ty.
2 1 1
Rather than simply contesting the validity of the tax sale because it
never received notice, Tsann Kuen challenged the constitutionality of the
notice statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-37-30 1,212 by alleging
that the statute failed to provide sufficient notice to nonresident landown-
ers.213 After considering the United States Supreme Court cases Mullane and
Mennonite, as well as discussing the state due process requirements set out
in Thompson, the Arkansas Supreme Court balanced Tsann Kuen's interest
in the property against the state's interest against "unduly burdensome" pro-
cedural requirements.2"4 According to the court, the risk of the state erro-
neously depriving the property owner of his property through a tax sale was
diminished by the requirement that a taxpayer provide his or her correct
address in the event of an address change.215 While the commissioner had
strictly complied with the tax sale statute, Tsann Kuen had failed to notify
206. 355 Ark. 110, 129 S.W.3d 822 (2003).
207. Id. at 115, 129 S.W.3d at 825.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 116, 129 S.W.3d at 825. County and state officials also published notice in the
local county and state newspapers. Id.
211. Id., 129 S.W.3d at 825.
212. ARK. CODEANN. § 26-37-301 (Repl. 1997).
213. Tsann Kuen, 355 Ark. at 117, 129 S.W.3d at 826. Tsann Kuen conceded that the
commissioner strictly complied with the notice statute. Id.
214. 1d. at 120, 129 S.W.3d at 828.
215. Id., 129 S.W.3d at 828; see ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 26-35-705 and 26-37-301 (Repl.
1997).
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the tax collector of its new addressed as required by statute and had caused
its own lack of notice.21 6
Next, the court rejected Tsann Kuen's argument that the statute pro-
vided insufficient notice because the legislature later amended section 26-
37-301 to require the commissioner to provide actual notice in certain cir-
cumstances.217 Under Arkansas case law, a litigant may "challenge the con-
stitutionality of a statute [only] if the statute is unconstitutional as applied to
the litigant;, 218 because the amended statute was not effective at the time of
the suit, Tsann Kuenn could show no injury as a result of the application of
the amended statute.2 19 The court also refused to issue an advisory opinion
"based on facts not in evidence and events that have not yet occurred," or to
determine "speculative and abstract questions of law., 220 Finally, the court
rejected Tsann Kuen's arguments that posting on the affected property
should have been required in its case, due to the fact that other Arkansas
statutes require notice by posting in other situations. 221' This was because the
statute Tsann Kuen offered in support of this argument actually provided
less notice than the applicable tax sale statute.222
Concluding its opinion, the court turned to other jurisdictions that have
also held that mailed notice to the property owner's last known address is
sufficient under the due process requirements. 223 The court also turned to
foreign jurisdiction in support of its conclusion that the commissioner was
not required to post notice on the delinquent property or mail notice to the
physical address of the delinquent property after receiving the returned no-
tices as "undeliverable. 224
Two years after deciding Tsann Kuen, the Arkansas Supreme Court
certified the Jones case in order to determine whether the commissioner
provided adequate notice of a tax foreclosure sale to a property owner who
failed to update his mailing address with the state.
III. THE CASE
The cause of action for Jones v. Flowers began in Arkansas in 1997,
when Gary Jones failed to pay his property taxes on a house in which he
216. Tsann Kuen, 355 Ark. at 121, 129 S.W.3d at 829.
217. Id. at 122-23, 129 S.W.3d at 829.
218. Chapman v. Bevilacqua, 344 Ark. 262, 269,42 S.W.3d 378, 382 (2001).
219. Tsann Kuen, 355 Ark. at 122, 129 S.W.3d at 829.
220. Id. at 122-23, 129 S.W.3d at 829-30.
221. Id. at 123, 129 S.W.3d at 830.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 125, 129 S.W.3d at 831.
224. Tsann Kuen, 355 Ark. at 126, 129 S.W.3d at 823.
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used to live with his wife.225 After the county certified the property as delin-
quent, the state sold the property to Linda Flowers.226 Although the state
attempted to notify Jones of the tax sale, he never received any of the state's
certified mail and first learned about the tax sale after the state served a no-
tice of eviction on his daughter.227 Jones sued Mark Wilcox, the Arkansas
Commissioner of State Lands ("the Commissioner"), in Arkansas state
court, alleging the state did not provide him with adequate notice before the
tax sale. 228 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the com-
missioner and concluded that the state's notice procedure complied with due
process.29 Jones appealed the trial court's decision, and the Arkansas Su-
preme Court affirmed. 23' The United States Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri, and a five-to-three majority lead by Chief Justice Roberts reversed and
remanded, holding that the state did not provide Jones with adequate notice
when the certified mail returned "unclaimed,, 23' and that the state could
have taken reasonable additional steps to provide adequate notice.232 Justice
Thomas disagreed, and in a dissent joined by two others he argued that the
majority misconstrued court precedent 233 and that the majority's decision
would create an undue burden on the state.234
A. Facts
In 1967, Arkansas resident Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North
Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas, where he lived with his wife until
they separated in 1993 .235 After the separation, Jones moved into an apart-
ment while his wife continued living in the house.2 36 For thirty years Jones
made timely mortgage payments on the house, with the mortgage company
225. See infra Part III.A.
226. See infra Part III.A.
227. See infra Part III.A.
228. See infra Part III.A.
229. See infra Part III.A.
230. See infra Part III.A.
231. See infra Part III.B. l.a.
232. See infra Part III.B.l.b.
233. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
234. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
235. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2006).
236. Id. Jones did not notify the tax collector of his new address when he moved to the
apartment as was legally required by Arkansas code section 26-35-705. Respondent's Brief
on the Merits at 4, Jones 1, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (No. 04-1477); see Jones v. Flowers, 359
Ark. 443, 446, 198 S.W.3d 520, 522 (2004) ("Jones 1"). While Jones admitted to this failure
to notify, according to him this information was "readily ascertainable from multiple sources,
including the Little Rock phone book, the Pulaski County roll of registered voters, and the
state income tax rolls." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Jones II, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006)
(No. 04-1477).
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paying the property taxes, but after the mortgage was paid off in 1997, the
property taxes went unpaid.237 As a result, on February 24, 2000, the proper-
ty was certified as delinquent.238
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-37-301, the commis-
sioner sent a letter to Jones, via certified mail, at the North Bryan Street
address in an attempt to notify Jones of the tax delinquency and his right to
redeem.239 Nobody signed for the letter, and after the letter remained un-
claimed at the post office for fifteen days,240 the post office returned the no-
tice to the commissioner as "unclaimed.
' 24
1
Two years later,242 on April 1, 2002, the commissioner posted notice of
a public sale of the North Bryan Street property in the Arkansas Democrat-
237. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. The property taxes for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, and
2000 were unpaid. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 446, 198 S.W.3d at 522.
238. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 446, 198 S.W.3d at 522. Prior to the Pulaski County Collector's
certification of forfeiture to the commissioner, the collector published redemption informa-
tion and notice of pending forfeiture following a failure to redeem in the Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette on January 18, 2000, pursuant to Arkansas code section 26-37-102. Brief for Res-
pondent Linda K. Flowers at 1, Jones II, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (No. 04-1477). The collector
also listed the North Bryan Sireet property along with other delinquent lands in a permanent
record open to public inspection according to Arkansas code section 26-37-106. Id. Also
prior to certification, the Pulaski County Assessor verified the assessment of taxes for 1997,
as well as the name and last known address of the owner of the North Bryan Street property
in accordance with Arkansas code section 26-37-103. Id. at 1-2.
239. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. According to the notice, the North Bryan Street property
would be subject to a public sale on April 17, 2002, unless Jones redeemed the property. Id.
The packet of information the commissioner sent also contained a proposed Petition to Re-
deem and instructions on the right to redeem. Brief for Respondent Linda K. Flowers, supra
note 238, at 2.
240. The post office attempted to deliver the written notice three times. Respondent's
Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Jones II, 126 S. Ct.
1708 (2006) (No. 04-1477).
241. Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. When certified mail is returned, a form accompanying
the returned mail indicates the return either as: "(1) unclaimed; (2) refused; (3) attempted-
not known; (4) insufficient address; (5) no such street/no such number; or (6) no such office
in state." Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 236, at 5 n.4. The form may also
indicate that there is no forwarding address or that the one on record has expired. Id. "When
certified mail is returned as unclaimed, this indicates that a written notice was left at the
address, but that no party went to the post office to receive delivery of the mail." Id. Accord-
ing to Flowers, "[t]here was no indication on the face of the letter that a forwarding order for
Mr. Jones had expired" or that the letter was undeliverable. Brief for Respondent Linda K.
Flowers, supra note 238, at 3.
242. During this time, the Commissioner purchased a title report on the North Bryan
property. Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 240, at 2. The title report showed, among other things, that (1) "Gary Kent Jones
was the record owner of title to the property when it was certified to the Commissioner of
State Lands in 2000;" (2) he continued to be the record owner on February 14, 2002; and (3)
the 717 North Bryan address was the "'address of record" for the owner of the property. Res-
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Gazette.243 Although no one submitted bids on the date of public sale,'"
Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer on February 5, 2003.245 On Febru-
ary 19, 2003, the commissioner sent another letter by certified mail to Jones
at the North Bryan Street address, notifying Jones that his house would be
sold on March 21, 2003, if he did not pay the delinquent taxes on the proper-
ty and associated penalties.246 This notice was also returned to the commis-
sioner's office marked "unclaimed., 247 Flowers's purchase offer was ap-
proved,24' and she purchased the home on May 28, 2003.249 After the thirty-
pondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
240, at 2-3.
243. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette was the newspaper of
record in Pulaski County, where the property was located. The notice included the sale date
of April 17, 2002, and redemption information. Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Oppo-
sition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at 3.
244. The lack of bids permitted the state to enter into a private sale on the property. Jones
II, 126 S. Ct. at 1712; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-202(b) (LEXIS 2004), amended by 2007
Ark. Laws Act 706 (April 4, 2007).
245. Jones 1, 359 Ark. 443, 447, 198 S.W.3d 520, 522 (2004). According to the commis-
sioner and Flowers, the commissioner's office performed additional research at this point,
which included "another review of real property records to confirm ownership and address
information, a visit to the property to determine whether it still existed as described in the
legal description and deed records, and a physical description of the house and the immediate
vicinity." Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 240, at 3. The Joneses claimed that the state "made no effort to ascertain the cor-
rect mailing address for Mr. Jones or to provide effective notice of the impending sale," not-
ing that the state could easily discover Jones's address and that the state did not post notice
on the home when its personnel visited the property. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 236, at 4.
246. Jones 1, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522.
247. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1712. Not surprisingly, the commissioner and Flowers placed
the blame on Mrs. Jones for her failure to inform her husband of the commissioner's attempts
to notify him: "Mrs. Jones, living at the property, again failed and refused to pick up this
mail." Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 240, at 4. Once again, there was no indication that "a forwarding order for Mr.
Jones had expired" or that the letter was undeliverable. Brief for Respondent Linda K. Flow-
ers, supra note 238, at 4.
248. The commissioner approved Flowers's offer on April 11, 2003, and the Arkansas
Attorney General approved Flowers's offer on May 28, 2003. Respondent's Joint Response
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at 4.
249. Jones 1, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522. The commissioner issued Flowers a
Limited Warranty Deed. Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at 4. Flowers purchased the house for $21,042.15, and at
trial the parties stipulated that the house had a fair market value of $80,000. Jones II, 126 S.
Ct. at 1713.
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day statutory redemption period passed,25° the commissioner posted an un-
lawful detainer notice at the house.25'
After learning of the tax sale, Jones initiated a lawsuit in Arkansas state
court against the commissioner and Flowers. 2 Jones alleged that the sale of
his home was invalid and constituted the taking of his property without due
process because the commissioner failed to provide him with actual notice
of the tax sale or his right to redeem the property.253 On August 20, 2003,
Flowers filed a counterclaim for unlawful detainer 254 and later filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the notices sent by the State "provided
constitutionally sufficient notice. '255 The commissioner filed a similar mo-
tion for summary judgment on November 17, 2003.256 Subsequently, Jones
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the basis that the commis-
sioner admitted having no knowledge of Jones receiving the two notices.257
On January 14, 2004, the trial court found that Arkansas code section
26 -3 7 -30 1,25R which outlines the notice procedure the commissioner fol-
250. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-202(e) (LEXIS 2004), amended by 2007 Ark. Laws Act
706 (April 4, 2007).
251. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. Court opinions and documents differ on how the com-
missioner actually served the unlawful detainer notice. According to the United States Su-
preme Court opinion, the commissioner served Jones's daughter with the notice. Id. Accord-
ing to the Arkansas Supreme Court, however, the notice was posted on the door of the North
Bryan Street house. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522. Similarly, Jones's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari also states that the commissioner posted notice on the door of the
house. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 4. Jones changed his position in his
brief for the Supreme Court, however, by stating that the commissioner served his daughter
Cindy Edrington with notice. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (No.
04-1477).
252. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. Jones filed his complaint on July 28, 2003, in the Cir-
cuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, Sixth Division (CV 2003-8565). Respondent's Brief
on the Merits, supra note 236, at 6.
253. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522. Jones also challenged Arkansas code
section 26-37-301, but did not challenge any other section of the code, nor did he attack "the
statutory scheme as a whole." Respondent's Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at 5.
254. Jones 1, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522. In his answer to Flowers's counter-
claim, Jones "admitted that he received actual notice of [the] notice to vacate, posted on the
property on July 2[, 2003]." Id. In an amended complaint filed September 17, 2003, Jones
added his wife as a plaintiff because she was living in the house. Id. By the time the case
reached the United States Supreme Court, Mrs. Jones was no longer a party to the action.
Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 218, at 6 n.7.
255. Jones 1, 359 Ark. at 447, 198 S.W.3d at 522.
256. Id.
257. Id. "Attached to the motions were affidavits by Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones averring
that they never received notice of their right to redeem the property after the tax sale." Id.
Jones also claimed that he was entitled to actual notice for failure to pay his taxes. Respon-
dents' Brief on the Merits, supra note 236, at 6-7.
258. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-301 (Repl. 1997), amended by 2007 Ark Laws Acts 706,
1036, and 827 (2007). Effective January 1, 2004, this statute was amended "to require per-
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lowed, "complied with the constitutional due process requirements." '59 The
trial court granted Flowers's and the commissioner's motions for summary
judgment, thereby denying Jones' motion.2' The court also granted Flow-
ers's counterclaim for unlawful detainer, entitling her to immediate posses-
sion of the North Bryan Street property.26' Jones then appealed, and the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court certified this case.262
On appeal, Jones argued that Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-37-
202(e) was unconstitutional "because it [did] not require notice of the prop-
erty owner's right to redeem after the tax sale," 263 and that the trial court
should have ruled that the state was required "to locate Mr. Jones's correct
address after the tax-sale notices were returned to the State unclaimed.,
26
1
On November 18, 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed265 the trial
court's order, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the
commissioner had complied with section 26-37-301 by attempting to pro-
vide notice through certified mail and publication, and upholding the trial
sonal service of process on the owner of a homestead, if the State fails to receive proof that
the notice sent by certified mail was received by the owner." Brief for Petitioner, supra note
251, at 5 n.3. The amendment does not apply to this case. Id.
259. Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1713.
260. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 448, 198 S.W.3d at 522.
261. Id.
262. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 251, at 5; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note
236, at 5. The Arkansas Supreme Court heard the appeal without oral argument. Respon-
dents' Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at
5.
263. The Arkansas Supreme Court did not address this argument because it was not pre-
served for appellate review. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 448-49, 198 S.W.3d at 523. In order for an
issue to be considered on appeal, a party must obtain a ruling on the issue. Id. In this case, the
failure of the trial court to rule on the issue of "whether [§] 26-37-202(e) is unconstitutional
for failing to include a notice requirement" acted as a procedural bar to appellate considera-
tion of the issue. Id. at 448, 198 S.W.3d at 523. Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that "constitutional arguments must be raised and fully developed in the trial court." Id.
While Jones raised the issue of the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-
37-202(e) in his "Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" and "Plaintiff's Memo-
randum to Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment," the trial court did not
address the issue, and it would have been inappropriate for the court to do so. Id.
264. Id. at 449, 198 S.W.3d at 523. Jones argued that due process required the commis-
sioner "to conduct a reasonable search of public records in an attempt to ascertain Mr. Jones's
correct address before selling his property." Respondents' Brief on the Merits, supra note
236, at 7. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with Flowers and the commissioner that due
process only requires an attempt to provide actual notice. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 449, 198
S.W.3d at 523. Not only did Jones fail to comply with Arkansas code section 26-35-705 by
failing to notify the tax collector of his new address when he moved out of the North Bryan
Street house, but his brief also admitted that due process does not require actual notice. Id. at
453, 198 S.W.3d at 526.
265. The court unanimously affirmed the decision. Brief for Respondent Linda K. Flow-
ers, supra note 238, at 6; Respondents' Joint Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 240, at 5.
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court's finding that the tax sale was valid.266 Citing the United States Su-
preme Court, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that due process requires
that notice be reasonably calculated "to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of [an] action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. 2 67 The court held that the state's notice procedures complied with this
standard,268 and therefore due process did not require the commissioner to
provide Jones with actual notice.269
Jones filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court,
which the court denied unanimously without argument.27 ° On September 27,
2005, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 71 to resolve the
issue of "whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to take
additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice of a tax
sale is returned undelivered.,
272
B. Reasoning
In Jones v. Flowers,273 the United States Supreme Court sought to de-
termine whether a state is required to take additional reasonable steps to
provide a property owner with notice of a tax sale when attempted notice of
the sale is returned to the state "unclaimed., 274 In chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion, 75 the Court began its analysis by examining the adequacy
of Arkansas's notice system before selling an individual's home by a tax
sale.276 After concluding that the state should have taken additional reasona-
ble steps after receiving the returned notice, the Court discussed whether
such additional steps were available.2 7 Although stopping short of prescrib-
ing exactly what additional steps the state should take,278 the Court made
certain suggestions in concluding that additional reasonable steps were
266. Jones I, 359 Ark. at 454, 198 S.W.3d at 527.
267. Id. at 450, 198 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (1950)).
268. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 5.
269. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2006).
270. Brief for Respondent Linda K. Flowers, supra note 238, at 6; Respondents' Joint
Response Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 236, at 5-6.
271. Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005).
272. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1713.
273. 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006).
274. Id. at 1712.
275. Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
276. See infra Part III.B. l.a.
277. See infra Part IlI.B. 1 .b.
278. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1718 (noting that it is not the Court's responsibility "to pre-
scribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt" (quoting Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U.S. 444,455 (1982)).
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available and dismissed the commissioner's arguments against additional
requirements.279
In a dissent joined by two others,28° Justice Thomas argued that Arkan-
sas's notice system satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause,
and therefore the Constitution did not require the state to take additional
reasonable steps after receiving the returned notice.28' After distinguishing
the present case from others the majority cited in reaching its decision, Jus-
tice Thomas concluded that the additional methods the majority proposed
were unnecessary, burdensome, impractical, and unlikely to achieve the
desired result of providing more effective notice.282 Because the property
owner failed to protect his own interest, Justice Thomas reasoned that the
state should not be burdened with additional obligations.
283
1. Chief Justice Roberts's Majority Opinion
a. The inadequacy of the Arkansas notice system
In determining the adequacy of Arkansas's notice system, the Court
first examined what kind of notice due process requires when the state seeks
to take an individual's property.284 The state does not have to provide actual
notice to the property owner, but only notice that is "reasonably calculated"
to inform the property owner of the pending tax sale and to allow the prop-
erty owner the opportunity to object to the sale.285 If the notice is reasonably
calculated to reach the intended recipient at the time it is sent, then the no-
tice is sufficient.2 86 According to the Court, however, this case presented a
new issue of whether the government has an additional responsibility to
provide notice after it learns that its first attempt to provide notice failed.287
In order to answer what it considered a "new wrinkle," the Court ex-
amined opinions from the courts of appeals and state supreme courts consi-
279. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
280. Justice Thomas was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy in his dissenting opinion.
Jones H, 126 S. Ct. at 1721.
281. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
282. See infra Part 11I.B.2.b.
283. See infra Part IlI.B.2.b.
284. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. at 1713-14.
285. Id. According to the commissioner, the state satisfied the due process requirement
when it sent Jones notice via certified mail, because this method of notice was reasonably
calculated "to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale." Id. at 1714.
286. Id. at 1714 (noting that in the cases reaching this decision, the government had sent
notice but heard nothing back suggesting that the notice had failed).
287. Id. According to the Court, the notice required in a particular case "will vary with
circumstances and conditions," and therefore it must determine whether the knowledge on the
part of the government that its attempted notice failed constitutes a "circumstance and condi-
tion that varies the notice required." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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dering the new issue and found that most of these courts require the state
government to take additional steps after the government discovers its at-
tempted notice failed. 288 Likewise, the Court noted that many state statutes
require the government to go beyond "simply mail[ing] notice. 2 89 Although
the Court itself had considered the adequacy of notice in other situations,29°
this case involved the adequacy of notice "prior to the [s]tate extinguishing a
property owner's interest in a home., 29' After stating the rule that the means
used to give notice "must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,"' 292 the Court concluded
that a person actually "desirous" of informing a property owner of a tax sale
on his home would do more than nothing when certified notice of the sale
was returned unclaimed. 93 Because the state in this case took no further
action when the notice was returned, it did not act "[as] someone 'desirous
of actually informing' Jones would do.,
294
Next, in considering the adequacy of notice in the present case, the
Court turned to other cases in which it required the government to consider
an intended recipient's specific information when sending notice, even
though the "statutory scheme" was ordinarily sufficient.295 For instance, if
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1715. Additional required steps include giving notice to the occupants of the
property, posting notice "on the property or at the property owner's last known address," or
making a "diligent inquiry" to find the correct address of a property owner when the notice is
returned. Id. at 1715 n.2.
290. The Supreme Court had previously considered the adequacy of notice in relation to
"beneficiaries of a common trust fund .... a mortgagee .... owners of seized cash and auto-
mobiles, . . . creditors of an estate, . . . and tenants living in public housing." Jones II, 126 S.
Ct. 1708, 1715 (2006).
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950)).
293. Id. at 1716. The Court then gave a very eloquent example in order to highlight its
conclusion:
If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers,
handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman acciden-
tally dropped the letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the
Commissioner's office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again. No
one "desirous of actually informing" the owners would simply shrug his shoul-
ders as the letters disappeared and say "I tried."
Id.
294. Id. The Court reasoned that someone will ordinarily try to resend a returned letter,
especially if the subject matter of the letter is important, and that the state should have known
that Jones was "no better off than if the notice had never been sent" when the post office





the state knew that the property owner was in prison296 or that the property
owner was incompetent,297 the Court held that the normal notice procedures
were insufficient because the government knew that ordinary notice would
be ineffective.29 Knowledge on the part of the government that notice
would be ineffective constituted a "praticalit[y] and peculiarit[y]" that the
Court considered in determining the constitutional adequacy of the notice.299
Even though the commissioner in this case did not discover that the notice
was ineffective until after he sent it, the Court determined that it should take
into account the state's knowledge of ineffective notice in the same way it
had in previous cases determining the adequacy of the notice.3"'
After briefly discussing how to assess the constitutionality of a particu-
lar notice procedure,0 1 the Court noted three of the commissioner's argu-
ments that due process did not require additional notice after the post office
returned the letter unclaimed.0 2 First, because the state sent notice to an
address that Jones had a legal obligation to update, Jones's failure to update
his address as required by statute forfeited his right to constitutionally suffi-
cient notice.30 3 Although the Court agreed with the commissioner and noted
that the Arkansas statute requiring the address change3" strongly supported
the argument that notice sent to the North Bryan Street address was reason-
ably calculated to reach Jones, the Commissioner was still unreasonable in
doing nothing when the notice returned as unclaimed.30 5
According to the commissioner's second argument, the government put
Jones on inquiry notice that it would take his property after he failed to pay
his property taxes and did not receive a property tax bill.306 The Court dis-
296. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972). The Court found that "forfeiture
proceedings sent to a vehicle owner's home address [were] inadequate." Jones II, 126 S. Ct.
1708, 1716 (2006).
297. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956). Mailing, posting, and
publicizing notice of foreclosure was inadequate. Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1716.
298. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1716.
299. Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950)).
300. Id. The majority dismissed the dissent's concern that the state did not discover that
the notice was ineffective until "long after the fact," because the state had to wait two years
before taking possession of the property. Id.
301. Id. at 1717 (noting that "the failure of notice in a specific case does not establish the
inadequacy of the attempted notice," and that the constitutionality of a notice procedure "is
assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc").
302. Id. After first stating the commissioner's three arguments, the Court held that they
were insufficient in relieving the state "of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate
notice." Id.
303. Id.
304. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-35-705 (Repl. 1997).
305. Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1717.
306. Id.
[Vol. 30
CONSTITUTIONAL & PROPERTY LAW
missed this argument through one of its previous holdings, which stated that
"knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to no-
tice that a tax sale is pending."3 °7 The government must still provide consti-
tutionally sufficient notice even though the property owner knows that the
government can take his property when his property taxes go unpaid.30 8 Fur-
thermore, because a delinquent taxpayer may redeem his property, the fail-
ure to pay taxes alone cannot justify inadequate notice.3"9
For its third and final position, the commissioner argued that the state
could assume that Jones left his property in the hands of someone who
would alert Jones if his property was in danger.3"0 Although the commis-
sioner's assumption was based on Court precedent, the Court distinguished
the present case from other seizures where the absent owner would quickly
realize his dilemma, such as "libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel[,] or
entry upon real estate in the name of law."31' According to the Court, a
property occupant is not required to serve as the owner's agent in all situa-
tions, especially in the present case where the occupant is prevented from
receiving certified mail for the owner without the owner's signature.3"2 Fur-
thermore, a certified mail slip from the commissioner in no way obviates the
danger that the owner might lose his property.3 13 Although the Court recog-
nized that Jones "should have been more diligent" in taking care of his
property, it concluded that the state was still required under due process to
provide Jones with adequate notice before seizing his property.314
b. Additional reasonable steps
Having concluded that the state "should have taken additional reasona-
ble steps to notify Jones," the Supreme Court next considered whether any
307. Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)).
308. Id. The Court used an analogy to highlight this point. Even though most people
know that they have the "right to remain silent" when arrested, that does not mean that a
police officer is not required to provide an arrestee with his Miranda warnings. Id. at 1717-
18.
309. Id. at 1718.
310. Id. ("[T]he [s]tate can assume an owner leaves his property in the hands of one who
will inform him if his interest is in jeopardy.") (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950)).
311. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316).
312. Id.
313. Id. The purpose of the certified mail would be unknown to the occupant, and the
commissioner might write to property owners on other matters like state parks or highway
construction. Id.
314. Id. ("[B]efore forcing a citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due
process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.") (citing
Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799).
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additional steps were practically available.315 After stating that the Court has
no duty actually to prescribe a form of notice for the government, the Court
concluded that several additional reasonable steps were available to the
state.316
The first additional reasonable step the Court suggested was resending
the notice by regular mail, which would eliminate the problem of requiring
the recipient's signature.3"7 Although the commissioner asserted that certi-
fied mail was more likely to provide actual notice to the property owner, the
Court held that certified mail would be less likely to provide actual notice in
some circumstances. 3 8 Regular mail, on the other hand, increases the chance
of notice when the property owner has moved, because the occupant might
leave the property owner's correct address for the postman or might notify
the property owner directly of the notice.31 9
Two other suggested additional reasonable steps were: (1) posting no-
tice on the front door of the home, or (2) addressing mail to "occupant. '320
Both of these methods would increase the likelihood that the property owner
would receive notice: The occupant would be less likely to ignore them and
there would be a "significant chance" that the occupant would contact the
property owner, if only out of concern for their own occupancy of the prop-
erty.32' The Court declined, however, to go so far as to require the state to
search for Jones's new address in public and government records,322 stating
that such an "open-ended search" would place a far heavier burden on the
state than its other recommendations.323
315. Id. (noting that "if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could
have taken... it cannot be faulted for doing nothing").
316. Id. Whether a step is reasonable depends on what kind of additional information the
state receives. For instance, in the present case, the return of the notice as "unclaimed" meant
one of two things: (1) Jones still lived at the North Bryan Street house but was not home to
receive the letter and did not go pick it up at the post office, or (2) Jones no longer lived at
that address. Id. The additional reasonable steps suggested by the Court are directed at these
two possibilities.
317. Jones 1, 126 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
318. Id. at 1719. According to the Court, "certified mail makes actual notice more likely.
*. [only] when someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he has
arrived at the wrong address." Id. Certified mail might be less likely to provide actual notice
because it cannot be left at the address to be examined later and "can only be retrieved from
the post office for a specified period of time." Id. As far as dispatching and handling the mail
in transit, certified mail and regular mail are treated the same. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. (noting that Jones first learned about the tax sale after his daughter, who living at
the house at the time, was served with an unlawful detainer notice).
322. Id. Including the phone book (public record) and income tax rolls (government
record). Id.
323. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court cited several reasons for this decision: (1) the
return of the notice as "unclaimed" did not necessarily mean that the notice was sent to the
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After suggesting several additional reasonable steps that the state could
have taken, the Court turned to the commissioner's complaint that these
additional steps would place a heavy burden on the state.3 24 The first prob-
lem with this argument, according to the Court, was that Arkansas required
the additional step of personal service for homestead owners if the certified
mail notice was returned.325 Second, the commissioner offered no facts to
support the view that he would now have to locate "tens of thousands of
properties every year. 3 26 The Court also dismissed the assertion that posted
notice could be removed by "children or vandals," thus rendering it ineffec-
tive,27 and stated that, in general, posting notice is "a singularly appropriate
and effective way of ensuring that a person ... is actually apprised of pro-
ceedings against him. ' 328 Furthermore, the state could have avoided the cost
associated with completing a tax sale329 if the state had taken the Court's
"relatively easy" suggestions to provide notice in an attempt to collect effi-
ciently Jones's unpaid taxes.33°
The commissioner's attempt to notify Jones by publishing notice in the
state newspaper also failed to impress the Court, even though this "followup
measure[]" was not constitutionally required. 33' A property owner will find
notice by publication through "[c]hance alone, ' 332 and notice by publication
is adequate only if other means of providing adequate warning are not avail-
able.333 Therefore, because other means were available to provide Jones with
wrong address; (2) Jones was obligated to update his address with the tax collector pursuant
to Arkansas code section 26-35-705 (1997). Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-301(e) (Supp. 2005). The Court also cited the fact
that the State "transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or the tax sale purchaser" as further
reason for undermining the Commissioner's argument. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1719.
326. JonesI1, 126 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
327. The Solicitor General raised this point in his Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae, citing the Court's decision in Greene v. Lindsey. Id. at 1720.
328. Id. (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1982)).
329. Costs included "the burden and expense of purchasing a newspaper advertisement,
conducting an auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers." Id.
330. Id. The Court asserted that "[s]uccessfully providing notice is often the most effi-
cient way to collect unpaid taxes," citing Jones I ("more effective notice may ease [the] bur-
den on [the] State if [the] recipient arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to sale") as well as
the parties' oral arguments before the Court ("[eighty-five] percent of tax delinquent proper-
ties in Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency."). Id.
331. Id. The Court also considered the Solicitor General's argument that the Court's
suggested methods of providing notice were no more effective than the methods already in
place, like certified mail. Id. Although the Court noted that certified mail provides some
security against false claims, it added that this security comes with the price of also knowing
when notice has not been received, which is information the State cannot ignore. Id.
332. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. at 1720 ("[C]hance alone brings a person's attention to an adver-




adequate notice of the tax sale, notice by publication was not constitutional-
ly adequate.334
In the final part of the majority decision, the Court examined some
"basic principles about constitutionally required notice," which Justice
Thomas relied on in his dissenting opinion, and with which the Court found
no reason to disagree. 3 5 First, the Court will reject a notice rule if it does not
comply with Dusenbery336 and significantly departs from Mullane.337 The
Court distinguished the present case from the holding in Dusenbery because
the commissioner here had knowledge that the attempted notice had failed
when it was returned unclaimed. 33' The present case was also a significant
departure from Mullane because the commissioner should have done more
to notify Jones of the tax sale after the notice was returned unclaimed, and
the commissioner had additional means available.3 39 The majority therefore
used the same precedent as the dissent in restating its conclusions that (1)
Arkansas should have done more to try and inform Jones of the tax sale after
the attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed and (2) there were addi-
tional reasonable steps available to the state.34 °
The Court concluded its opinion by reasoning that it was not placing
too heavy of a burden on the state by requiring it to take additional steps to
provide notice, because the state exerts "extraordinary power against a prop-
erty owner" in taking and selling his property. 34' Accordingly, the Court
held that the state's attempted methods of notice did not satisfy the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause and therefore reversed the judgment of the
Arkansas Supreme Court and remanded the case.342
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
337. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Jones 11, 126
S. Ct. 1708, 1720 (2006).
338. Jones I1, 126 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court in Dusenbery found that notice sent to a
prison inmate was adequate, even though the state knew someone else had signed for the
prisoner's letter and the state could have required the prisoner himself to sign for the letter,
thereby making notice more likely. Id.
339. Id. at 1721. Mullane provides that "when notice is a person's due ... [t]he means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it." Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
340. Id. The Court also restated its position that it is not responsible for prescribing a
form of service for the state, and that the state should decide for itself "how to proceed in
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2. Justice Thomas's Dissent
a. Court precedent
After briefly discussing the facts and procedural history of the case,
Justice Thomas concluded that Court precedent supports the finding that
Arkansas's notice procedure filly satisfies the Due Process Clause require-
ments.343 In the first part of the dissent, Justice Thomas examined the Court
precedent that supported his decision.3" Before seizing an individual's
property, the state must provide that individual with notice that is "reasona-
bly calculated" to inform the individual of the pending seizure.3 45 Although
the method for providing notice must be the kind that someone "desirous of
actually informing the absentee" would use,346 the state is not required to use
"heroic efforts" in giving notice,3 47 nor must it abide by notice procedures
that "place impossible or impracticable obstacles in the way [of the
state]. 348 In fact, actual notice is not required, and a method is valid as long
as it is "reasonably certain" to inform the affected parties.3 49 Based on the
facts of the case, Justice Thomas concluded that Arkansas's means of at-
tempting to provide notice satisfied the Due Process Clause because they
were "reasonably calculated" to inform Jones of the tax sale.35°
343. Id. at 1722 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
344. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 292, 296-97, 299, 307, 310-11, 328,
336-39, most of the precedent cited by Justice Thomas was also cited by Chief Justice Ro-
berts in the majority opinion.
345. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1722 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
346. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1722 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at
315).
347. Id. (quoting Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002)).
348. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14).
349. Id. (quoting Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 169-70).
350. Id. Justice Thomas considered the following facts in reaching his decision:
The State mailed a notice by certified letter to the address provided by the peti-
tioner. The certified letter was returned to the State marked "unclaimed" after
three attempts to deliver it. The State then published a notice of public sale con-
taining redemption information in the [state paper]. After Flowers submitted a
purchase offer, the State sent yet another certified letter to petitioner at his record
address. That letter, too, was returned to the State marked "unclaimed" after
three delivery attempts.
Id. While the majority held there was no evidence that the post office had left notices of
attempted certified mail delivery at the North Bryan Street address, Justice Thomas pointed
out that postal carriers are required by United States Postal policy to leave notice "indicating
that delivery of certified mail had been attempted." Id. at 1722 n.l.
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According to Justice Thomas, Arkansas's attempts to provide notice
through certified mail alone were sufficient under due process,35' especially
because the state sent the notices to an address that Jones had provided.
352
The state could presume that Jones would act in his own interest as a proper-
ty owner by updating his mailing address or leaving his home in the hands
or someone who would protect his property interest and notify him if that
interest was in danger.353 Furthermore, although the majority was unim-
pressed with the state's notice by publication, Justice Thomas noted that this
method exceeded the minimum constitutional requirement as a secondary
method of notice, rather than the only method of providing notice, as the
majority seemed to consider it.
35 4
Next Justice Thomas turned to the majority's conclusion that the state
had an obligation to take additional steps to provide notice when it learned
that the "normal procedure was ineffective., 355 Justice Thomas disagreed on
two points. First, the majority abandoned its traditional practices and con-
siderations in determining whether the state's attempted notice was suffi-
cient.356 Rather than considering the reasonableness of the attempted notice
at the time the notice was sent, the majority based its decision on "informa-
tion that was unavailable when notice was sent., 357 According to Justice
Thomas, the majority's reasoning ran afoul of the Court's position that it
will evaluate the reasonableness of a notice procedure "by comparing it to
alternative methods that are identified after the fact., 35 Justice Thomas also
chided the majority's consideration of Arkansas's recently amended homes-
tead notice requirement, finding it contrary to a previous Court decision in
351. Id. Justice Thomas cited previous Supreme Court holdings to justify this position.
See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) ("mail
service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice.").
352. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1723 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court had previously
found that "notice mailed to [the affected party's] last known available address" was suffi-
cient for a tax sale. Id. (quoting Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. at 792, 798)
(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
353. Id.; see Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316 ("It is the part of common prudence for all those
who have interest in [a thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to pro-
tect it," and "[tihe ways of an owner with tangible property are such that he usually arranges
means to learn of any direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights."). According to
Justice Thomas, the majority got the issue wrong in characterizing it as whether the occupant
of the property must act as the owner's agent. Instead, the issue was "whether [the] petitioner
discharged his own duty to guard his interests." Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1723 n.3 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
354. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1723 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 1723.
356. Id. at 1723-24.
357. Id.
358. Id.; see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 171-72 (2002).
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which a state official could not be "penalized and told to 'try harder"' after
the state had "upgraded its policies."359 Second, Justice Thomas argued that
the majority's decision created a new rule contrary to Court precedent.360 As
a result of the majority's ruling, the state must consider additional notice
methods every time it becomes doubtful whether an interested party has
received notice, a requirement based on "speculative, newly acquired infor-
mation. 361
According to Justice Thomas, only twice before had the Court held that
attempted notice by mail and publication was insufficient, and in both of
those cases the state knew its method of notice would fail before attempting
to send the notice.362 In Robinson v. Hanrahan,363 the state knew that the
person it intended to serve was in prison, but the state sent notice proceed-
ings to the individual's home address, and therefore the Court held that the
attempted notice was not "reasonably calculated" to notify the interested
party.3 4 In the second case, Covey v. Town of Somers,365 the local officials
knew that the intended recipient of notice was incompetent, incapable of
handling her affairs, and was "unable to comprehend the meaning of the
,,366 onotices. In spite of this knowledge, the local government attempted no-
tice three separate ways, and the Court concluded that these methods were
not reasonably calculated to inform the interested party of the proceed-
ings.367 Justice Thomas distinguished the present case from those above be-
cause Arkansas did not know its method of notice would fail when it sent
the notice via certified mail. 368 The state had no reason to know that Jones
no longer lived at the North Bryan Street address when the notice returned
"unclaimed, 3 69 and Jones was legally obligated to keep his mailing address
359. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1724 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dusenbery v. United
States, 534 U.S. 161, 172 (2002)).
360. Id. Specifically, the majority's decision "is contrary to Dusenbery and a significant
departure from Mullane." Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
364. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1724 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
365. 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
366. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 1724. The local government attempted notice by mailing it, posting it, and
publishing it in the newspaper. Id.
368. Id. at 1725.
369. Id. Justice Thomas noted that "'[u]nclaimed' does not necessarily mean that an
address is no longer correct; it may indicate than an intended recipient has simply failed or
refused to claim mail." Id. The Postal Service uses different labels to indicate different things.
For instance, "Moved, Left No Address" indicates the addressee "moved and filed no change-
of-address order." Similarly, "Not Deliverable as Addressed-Unable to Forward" indicates
the mail is "undeliverable at address given; no change-of-address order on file; forwarding
20071
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up to date.37 ° Therefore, Arkansas lacked the specific knowledge that notice
would fail at the time the notice was sent, and the state was not obligated "to
correct a problem of petitioner's own creation.,
371
b. Undue burden and ineffective recommendations
Justice Thomas next attacked the majority's suggested notice methods
on the ground that they are "burdensome, impractical," and unlikely to pro-
vide notice more effectively than those that Arkansas actually used.372 First,
the majority decision overturns a notice system that Arkansas has found to
be "efficient and fair," and instead requires the state to locate those delin-
quent property owners whose own inefficiencies unreasonably burden the
state.373 Justice Thomas also noted that there is no basis for assuming that
requiring the state to find Jones's correct address would place significantly
greater burdens on the state than the suggestions that the majority out-
lined.
37 4
Second, regular mail, posting notice, and addressing mail to "occupant"
are "no more reasonably calculated to achieve notice" than certified mail or
notice by publication.3 75 Regular mail is even less effective than certified
mail because it is not tracked and delivery attempts are not recorded, which
invites interested parties to challenge the adequacy of the notice.376 Posting
notice is impracticable because the state organizes its records by legal de-
scription rather than address, making locating the properties very difficult.
377
Furthermore, in Greene v. Lindsey378 the Court stated that "posting is an
inherently unreliable method of notice. 3 79 As for addressing mail to "occu-
pant" rather than sending a certified letter to a specific individual, Justice
order expired." Id. at 1725, n.4. See supra note 241 for an explanation of the different kinds
of labels available for returned mail.
370. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1725 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas claimed the
majority's "storm drain" hypothetical was unpersuasive and stated that it presented a different
problem than the one present in this case. Id. at 1725 n.5.
371. Id. at 1725. Justice Thomas also noted that publication would have been sufficient




374. Id. at 1726 n.6. Justice Thomas reaches this conclusion even though Jones's proposal
for requiring the state to locate his correct mailing address is "severely flawed," noting the
commonality of the name "Jones." Id.
375. Id. at 1725-26.
376. Jones 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1726 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Essentially, regular mail is
"untraceable." Id.
377. Id.
378. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
379. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. at 1726 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas considered it "sheer speculation" that an occupant who ignored a
certified mail slip would instead read "a letter addressed to them (even as
'occupant')" rather than throwing it out as junk mail.380 The majority itself
recognized "the deficiencies of its proposed methods" with repeated use of
the word "might,"38' but justified its decision by reasoning that its suggested
methods "would increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified
that he was about to lose his property. 382 According to Justice Thomas,
however, the Court rejected this kind of reasoning in Dusenbery, and he
therefore found it unpersuasive.383
Justice Thomas concluded his dissenting opinion by stating that diffi-
culties created by a property owner's own failure to take care of his interests
should be a deciding factor in cases involving title to property.384 Just as
"[t]he meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the antics of tax evad-
ers and scofflaws," neither should Jones's own "self-created conundrum"
justify burdening the state with additional notice requirements.385 Therefore,
according to Justice Thomas, Arkansas's attempted methods of notice satis-
fied the requirements of the Due Process Clause and the Court should have
affirmed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.38 6
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
Despite the fact that the Jones case has been described as "remarkably
uninteresting" and a "yawn," '387 application of the Court's ruling spreads to
all states and "all levels of government, from the Internal Revenue Service
to local tax collectors," because of the court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.388 While scholars and critics disagree as to exactly what effect the
380. Id.
381. Examples of such language include "[flollowing up with regular mail might ...
increase the chances of actual notice"; "occupants who ignored certified mail slips ... might
scrawl the owner's address on the notice packet"; and "a letter addressed to [occupant] might
be opened and read." Id. (emphasis in original).
382. Id.
383. Id. In Dusenbery, the Court rejected an argument that "the FBI's notice was constitu-
tionally flawed because it was 'substantially less likely to bring home notice' than a feasible
substitute." Id. (quoting Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 17 1).
384. Id. at 1726-27.
385. Jones I, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1727 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
386. Id.
387. Editorial, Unremarkable Case Marks End of the Honeymoon for New Chief Justice,
AUGUSTA CHRON., May 7, 2006, at A05; see Borchers, supra note 85, at 343 ("When the
history of the United States Supreme Court in the early twenty-first century is written, Jones
v. Flowers [sic] will not be celebrated as one of the Court's great achievements.").
388. G. Savage, High Court Rules Against State's Seizure of House, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2006, at 10; see also Cheese Whiz, No Need to Pay Taxes Anymore: Officials Did Not Do
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Jones ruling will have, the Court still leaves unanswered some important
questions that will continue to cause problems in the future.389 Potential
causes for the Court's lack of guidance in certain areas include its disregard
for precedent and the addition of Chief Justice Roberts to the Court. 390 Im-
mediate effects of the Court's ruling include increased litigation, 391 an in-
creased burden on state governments, 392 and the creation of another obstacle
in the effort to cure urban blight.393
Rather than drawing a bright line for this state and others, the Court
creates a murky future for tax foreclosure sales. One of the most significant
reasons for the inadequacies of Jones is the absence of a fully-developed
court record. 394 Because the Arkansas court decided the case based on mo-
tions for summary judgment, not all of the facts of the case made it into the
court record, and therefore the record does not reflect the state's additional
steps after the notice returned "unclaimed." '395 For instance, the commission-
er sent a follow-up non-certified letter to Jones's address as well as a notice
to "occupant. 396 The majority in Jones recommended both of these methods
as additional reasonable steps the state should take when notice returns "un-
claimed," but because the lower court granted summary judgment to Flow-
ers and the commissioner, this fact remained outside the record and outside
the Court's consideration.
A. Unanswered Questions
One of the biggest problems with the Jones decision is the Court's fail-
ure to provide a clear standard for what exactly constitutes additional rea-
sonable requirements. Instead of providing definitive rules for the states to
follow, the majority hides behind the rule that it is not the Court's "respon-
sibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should
Enough When They Sent Certified Mail to 717 North Bryan Street, KAN. CITY STAR, June 1,
2006, at Al.
389. See infra Part IV.A; ROTUNDA& NOWAK, supra note 7, at 27-28 (Supp. 2007) ("The
... Jones opinion[] leave[s] the lower court judges with no clear guidelines for resolving
future cases regarding the adequacy of notice by mail, or by publication, in property forfei-
ture cases.").
390. See infra Part V.B.
391. See infra Part V.C1.
392. See infra Part IV.C.2.
393. See infra Part IV.C.3.
394. Interview with Carol Lincoln, Staff Attorney, Ark. Comm'r of State Lands, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Feb. 8, 2007).
395. Michael R. Wickline, Tax Sale Invalid, Justices Conclude: Supreme Court Reverses
State, 5-3, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 27, 2006.
396. Id.
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adopt," '397 and instead offers only suggestions that one critic has called "ne-
bulous formulations of what constitutes proper notice." '398 Even Erwin Che-
merinsky, an advocate of due process who hails the Jones ruling as an im-
portant one that "reaffirms the government's duty to provide meaningful
notice," writes that the Jones Court fails to answer the key question of the
case, namely "what constitutes sufficient effort by the government. '399 Short
of providing actual notice, the Court does little to explain what additional
steps the state must take, and the decision "highlights the difficulty in at-
tempting to obtain clear title through a tax sale in those instances where the
delinquent owners or lienors are unknown or unlocatable."400
Although the majority makes some suggestions as to what additional
steps a state may take when notice returns "unclaimed," the majority fails to
provide a workable standard and helps the state as little as possible. Al-
though regular mail initially appears satisfactory as an additional step,4"'
regular mail lacks the record of proof afforded by certified mail, and there-
fore the state could not prove it sent regular mail in a contest raised by a
taxpayer.4 2 Furthermore, habitual delinquent taxpayers could learn that
avoiding regular mail from the commissioner is just as effective as avoiding
certified mail from the commissioner, and therefore notice by regular mail
would fail to provide additional notice. Posting notice would likewise be
ineffective at providing additional notice for the reasons outlined in
Greene,40 3 namely that others could remove the notice before it would come
to the attention of the property owner, and that vacant property is difficult to
post. Furthermore, it is impossible for the commissioner to post notice on
every delinquent land within the state.40 4
Another question the Court fails to answer is what, if any, additional
reasonable steps are required when notice is returned marked something
other than "unclaimed., 40 5 The post office may mark undelivered certified
mail in a variety of ways,406 and the majority offers no guidance for the sce-
397. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (2006) (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,
455 n.9 (1982)).
398. Tax Sales, supra note 155, at 233.
399. Chemerinsky, Upholding Due Process, supra note 85, at 85.
400. Lorrin Hirano, Note, Notice in Non-Judicial Tax Sales, 10-AUG HAW. B.J. 4, 4
(2006).
401. After the Jones decision, the commissioner began sending regular mail to all delin-
quent property owners. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
402. See infra Part IV.B.I.
403. See supra Part II.A.3.
404. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
405. Carol Lincoln, the staff attorney to the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands,
agrees with this assertion.




nario in which the commissioner receives undelivered certified mail marked
"insufficient address," "refused," or "attempted." Instead, the state must
determine what more it has to do when notice returns other than "un-
claimed" and how many additional steps it must take.
Jones also offers no guidance as to what kind of burden the commis-
sioner has in attempting to identify a property owner's correct mailing ad-
dress.4 °7 For instance, how far back must the state search for the correct ad-
dress, and where should the state look?40 8 Marianne Jennings offers a some-
what tongue-in-cheek, yet critical answer: "[T]he tax official must deter-
mine what type of notice [is] appropriate[] using crystal balls, family situa-
tions, nature of the residential block, nosy neighbors, local bars, or any other
resource available for finding the taxpayer.,
409
B. Possible Explanations for Unanswered Questions
1. Malleable Principles of Due Process and Ignored Precedent
The lack of a definitive standard of adequate due process when notice
returns "unclaimed" stems partially from the fact that the majority and dis-
sent both used the same longstanding precedent to reach different results.410
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the principles on which the
Court relied are "sufficiently vague and inclusive" to allow for "widely di-
vergent applications."4" By relying on these "pliant" principles and failing
to provide a bright-line rule, the Court creates confusion that, for the lower
courts, could lead to increased litigation.412
While the Court's own malleable principles effectively allowed the ma-
jority in Jones to say whatever it wanted, the Court simply ignored Arkan-
sas's precedents for notice procedure, which reached as far back as 1950 and
as recently as 2002.413 As the dissent correctly points out, the majority's
opinion forecloses Arkansas's "reasonable system" of requiring the property
owner to update his current address and authorizing the state to send proper-
ty notices to this address.4t 4
Furthermore, the Tsann Kuen decision should have been controlling in
this case. In both Tsann Kuen and Jones, the taxpayer changed addresses
407. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
408. Id.
409. Marianne M. Jennings, The Tax Man Cometh, Ex Ante and Post Hoc: Jones v.
Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006), 35 REAL EST. L. J. 442, 445 n. 11(2006).
410. Tax Sales, supra note 155, at 233.
411. Id. at 237. Because the underlying due process principles "are so malleable," they
are "jurisprudentially useless." Id.
412. Id. at 240-41; see infra Part IV.C.1.
413. Editorial, supra note 387, at A05.
414. Jones II, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1725 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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without updating his or her mailing address with the county tax collector as
required by law. In both cases, the commissioner sent notice of the tax sale
by certified mail to the taxpayer's last known address on record. The post
office returned the mailed notices as "unclaimed" in both instances. Like-
wise, the commissioner in both cases performed a title search, which pro-
duced the same incorrect address on record, and the commissioner again
sent notice to that address. In both Tsann Kuen and Jones, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court focused on the taxpayer's duty to maintain an accurate, current
mailing address with the county tax collector in determining that the com-
missioner's strict compliance with the notice statute satisfied due process
requirements. In other words, the taxpayers in both Tsann Kuen and Jones
caused their own lack of notice, but the majority in Jones failed to consider
this crucial point and instead shouldered the state with the burden of "ineffi-
ciencies caused by delinquent taxpayers. 415
2. Different Court Members
Critics and scholars have also pointed to the Court's changed composi-
tion in membership as a source of the Court's most recent opinions.416 Al-
though the Court's 2005-2006 term began with a short period of unanimity
and "narrowly phrased decisions," the Court transitioned away from Chief
Justice Roberts's initial goal of soft-spoken, unanimous decisions after the
addition of Justice Alito.417 Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the Court's
transition by switching sides away from the conservative justices in Jones,4
which was the Chief Justice's first opinion to provoke a dissent.419 In this
415. Id. at 1725; see Jennings, supra note 409, at 449 ("Failure to get notice to the tax-
payer, even when the failure is the result of the taxpayer's non-compliance with the address
notification requirements, means that due process has failed.").
416. See generally Charles H. Whitebread, The 2005-2006 Term of the United States
Supreme Court: A Court in Transition, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2006). For those who might
think that a justice's views do not affect his decisions, see Symposium, Seeing the Emperor's
Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069,
1070 (2006) ("[Erwin Chemerinsky] was present at a conference of federal courts of appeals
judges when Justice Scalia said that his views do not affect his decisions .... The federal
court of appeals judge sitting next to [him] rolled her eyes and said, 'What nonsense."').
417. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 11; see also Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, 2006 Supreme
Court Review for Tennessee Lawyers, 42-SEP TENN. B.J. 26, 26 (2006). According to
Charles Whitebread, this transitioning status makes future decisions "uncertain" and "almost
impossible to predict." Whitebread, supra note 416, at 173.
418. Editorial, supra note 387, at A05. One writer suggests that the conservative split
between Chief Justice Roberts and the other conservative justices stems from a divergence of
approaches to constitutional issues. Tax Sales, supra note 155, at 242-43.
419. Greenhouse, supra note 175, at Al 8. Chemerinsky identifies the Jones case as the
only one "in which either Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito did not come to the conclu-
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case, Chief Justice Roberts broke with the conservative justices and with the
Bush administration lawyers arguing in favor of the state government, in-
stead aligning himself with the Court's liberal justices.42
Although Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Jones favors a "flexible"
approach that "accommodate[s] human frailty" '' and shows that the Chief
Justice can be a "practical person and a realist,"422 this ability to bend the
rules and allow a "play in the joints" of the legal system comes at the ex-
pense of certainty afforded by bright-line rules. 423 According to one critic,
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion led the court "into a swamp of gooey gene-
rosity" highlighted by "gummy" reasoning.424
C. Immediate Effects
1. Increased Litigation
The Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands' office has already faced
an increase in litigation over tax sales of delinquent property, especially in
cases with unclaimed notice letters that would have otherwise been adequate
sales. 425 Because there is no statute of limitations for a due process violation,
a property owner who lost his property through a tax foreclosure sale may
bring a cause of action at a much later date after the sale and may eventually
have the tax sale voided, thereby divesting the property from the new pur-
chaser.426 Increased litigation, in turn, makes it much more difficult for the
state taxing authority to sell delinquent property.4 27 Because a title insurer
must pay the purchaser of the delinquent land in case the purchaser loses
title to the property, the title underwriter will be reluctant to insure the prop-
erty or may "downright refus[e]" to do so.
428
sion that would be regarded as the 'conservative result."' Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy
Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 346 n.1.
420. Savage, supra note 388, at 10. Chemerinsky finds it "disturbing" that Scalia, Kenne-
dy and Thomas dissented "and would have allowed the government to sell a person's home
with no more of an effort at notice than mailing a couple of letters." Chemerinsky, supra note
79, at 85.
421. Michael Halley, Chief Justice Roberts Shows a Surprising Willingness to Bend the
Rules, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 24, 2006, at 7.
422. Savage, supra note 388, at 10.
423. Halley, supra note 421, at 7.
424. Editorial, supra note 387, at A05 (calling this kind of reasoning "spearmint jurispru-
dence").
425. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
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Another issue with the potential to spawn increased litigation concerns
equal protection for delinquent property.429 For instance, if the state gov-
ernment does a lot of work in attempting to notify the delinquent property
owner of one parcel but does not do as much work with another parcel,
430
then the owner of the second parcel may bring an equal protection action.431
By basing notice on the particularities of a certain case and thereby allowing
for a variety of notices, the Court allows a delinquent property owner to
point to the efforts made by the state in one case "and complain that those
same actions were not taken in his or her situation. 432 Any attempt by the
state to reduce these causes of action necessarily leads to an increased bur-
den on the state government to develop a uniform notice procedure.
2. Increased Burden on State Governments
Some scholars indicate that the Jones case will actually have little ef-
fect on state notice requirements because the facts of the case limit the
Court's holding.433 Despite these speculations, Jones "requires a revolution
in the states' processes for sales of land for delinquent taxes., 434 Although
the commissioner's chief of staff said that the ruling "really doesn't change
anything," stating further that the government would not have to do any-
thing except amend the Arkansas code, he admitted that the commissioner's
office could not post notice on every property.435
A large amount of the increased burden on the state could stem from
the state's attempt to avoid litigation. State governments can no longer rely
on time-honored and longstanding notice procedures; they must change their
notice procedures in order to avoid debates over what types and forms of
additional notice due process requires.4 36 Accordingly, states must develop a
"uniform Plan B" to address the possibility of failed due process.4 37
429. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
430. This is especially true with vacant lots, where there is no structure on which the
government can post notice.
431. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
432. Jennings, supra note 409, at 448.
433. See, e.g., Tax Sales, supra note 155, at 237 ("[T]he effect of the decision will be
limited, both doctrinally and practically.").
434. Jennings, supra note 409, at 448; see Borchers, supra note 85, at 346 ("Arkansas
(and probably several other states) will have to amend their tax sales statutes to require fol-
low-up measures of the kind the Court endorsed.").
435. Wickline, supra note 395. Carol Lincoln also stated that it would be impossible for
the State to post notice on every delinquent property. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra
note 394.
436. See Jennings, supra note 409, at 448; see also Part IV.C.I supra.
437. Jennings, supra note 409, at 449. Jennings offers several steps for the states to take
in order to decrease litigation to set aside tax foreclosure sales for lack of notice:
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Rather than helping the government achieve its goal of receiving tax
payments, the Jones decision may create a loophole for delinquent taxpay-
ers.43s Essentially, Jones instructs a delinquent taxpayer never to pick up his
certified mail. 439 Because the post office will return the undelivered certified
mail notice, and because the state cannot prove that it sent regular mail, the
state is left with the options of either posting notice on every property or
personally serving the taxpayer." The amount of property certified to the
commissioner as delinquent effectively prevents posting notice on every
delinquent parcel, and therefore the government is left with the option of
personal service, which the Court has expressly rejected.44 '
3. Another Obstacle in the Attempt to Cure Urban Blight
Jones also has the potential to create a further obstacle in the process of
curing urban blight in Little Rock and other larger Arkansas cities. It is al-
ready extremely difficult to cure blight in Arkansas because of the state's
long tax foreclosure process and because of the delinquent taxpayer's ability
to redeem." Arkansas's tax foreclosure process is one of the longest in the
country, with tax-delinquent property taking at least five years to work its
way through the process with an additional two years before a new owner
may make any improvements. 4" Furthermore, if the delinquent property
owner pays back taxes before the property is auctioned, then the process
begins again, requiring at least another seven years before a new purchaser
may make improvements to the property. 444 Various organizations within
Clarify with tax notices the need for up-to-date addresses for owners; [c]onsider
additional legislation that is applicable to mortgage lenders that requires them to
notify property owners, upon satisfaction of underlying mortgage debt, that the
tax payments that have been part of the loan arrangements end and that the re-
sponsibility for payment of taxes now shifts to them individually; [p]rovide statu-
tory steps for notice, particularly actions required when letters are returned "un-
claimed;" [c]onsider the application of personal service standards either ab initiio
or following "unclaimed" results from mailed notice; [p]rovide clear time re-
quirements for notices and follow-ups.
Id. at 448-49. All of these recommendations require immediate action, thereby increasing the
burden on the state tax officials and state legislatures. Id. at 449.
438. Interview with Carol Lincoln, supra note 394.
439. Id. This is especially true with habitually delinquent taxpayers who are going to
know not to pick up their mail. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Jennifer Barnett Reed, New Tools to Fight Blight: Legislation Would Allow City to
Form a "Land Bank" to Redevelop Abandoned Property, ARK. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at 9.
443. Id. "The former owner has two years to challenge the sale" after the new buyer pur-
chases the property, and the new buyer will not receive any investment back from improve-
ments if the former owner wins the suit. Id.
444. Id.
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Little Rock buy delinquent property in the Downtown and Little Rock Cen-
tral High School areas in an attempt to renovate these properties into pro-
ductive pieces of land, but the Jones decision adds uncertainty to the effec-
tiveness of the tax sale, which could effectively discourage improvement of
blighted areas. 445
The Arkansas Eighty-Sixth General Assembly recently passed legisla-
tion that may mitigate against Jones's negative effect on curing urban
blight.446 First, Act 1036 (Senate Bill 373) shortens both the time the com-
missioner may sell delinquent property from one year to two and the time a
former property owner may contest the sale." 7 Second, Act 1037 (Senate
Bill 377) makes it easier for purchasers of delinquent property to get title
insurance."4 Third, Act 854 (Senate Bill 372) allows "cities to foreclose on
abandoned properties if owners failed to repay the city for maintenance
costs."' 9 Senate Bill 376, which would have given larger cities within the
state the power to establish land banks,45° failed to pass the House.
D. Conclusion
In essence, the Jones decision fails to consider the interests of the state
in requiring additional steps after the post office returns attempted notice
"unclaimed." Just as it was unfair for the Court to ask the commissioner to
"think outside the box" of longstanding local rules and requirements in this
particular case, it is unfair to require the government to change its notice
proceeding without providing some indication of what direction the state
should follow. Furthermore, the Court offers no guarantees that any new
notice procedures will pass due process muster, and the vague and malleable
principles on which the Court relies allow the Court effectively to say what-
ever it wants. After bringing together competing interests of the delinquent
property owner and the state, the Court leaves it to the state government to
sort out the mess it has created, allowing for the real possibility for future
litigation and due process claims. Rather than clarifying the due process
issue, the Court has only further muddied the waters and provided an escape
445. See Warwick Sabin, Downtown Partnership Wants Expansion, ARK. TIMES, Nov.
11, 2006 (discussing the efforts of the Downtown Partnership to revitalize downtown Little
Rock).
446. See id. The Arkansas Times published Reed's article before the Eighty-Sixth Gener-
al Assembly was completed, and the article only gives reference to the Senate Bill numbers. I
have given the new Act numbers as well as the Senate Bill numbers referenced in the Reed
article.
447. Id.; see Act of Apr. 4, 2007, No. 1036, 2007 Ark. Acts 1036.
448. Reed, supra note 442, at 9; see Act of Apr. 4, 2007, No. 1037, 2007 Ark. Acts 1037.
449. Reed, supra note 442, at 9; see Act of Apr. 3, 2007, No. 854, 2007 Ark. Acts 854.
450. Reed, supra note 442, at 9.
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hatch for delinquent taxpayers to cheat the system and get away with disre-
garding their obligations under the law.
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